Validating a social model wargame: an analysis of the Green Country Model by Kinyon, Teresa M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-12
Validating a social model wargame: an analysis of
the Green Country Model
Kinyon, Teresa M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
VALIDATING A SOCIAL MODEL WARGAME: 








 Thesis Advisor:   Samuel Buttrey 
 Second Reader: Walter DeGrange 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Validating a Social Model Wargame:  An Analysis of 
the Green Country Model 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Teresa M. Kinyon 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ______N/A______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Modern most wargaming models are a simulation of large force-on-force conflicts, and are not capable of articulating 
social factors of the society being modeled. The Green Country Model (GCM) was established as a two-player 
wargame utilizing unconventional and irregular warfare tactics, taking in consideration the effects of social factors on 
the population and stability operations of the regions (winning the “hearts and minds” of a society). The game is not 
meant to offer predictions for a course of action or the impact of a course of action on the future, but to provide 
players, particularly those players who are leaders, a forum in which to discuss strategy, tactics and possible courses 
of action, thus improving the knowledge base and ability to “think outside the box” concerning various regions. 
Utilizing the concepts, input parameters, and underlying algorithms established by Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Lab, we build a simulation model to begin the validation process of the GCM. This model, which can run one 
action in thousandths of a second, will not only provide developers a framework for continued validation, but can 









14. SUBJECT TERMS Social Model, wargame, PMESII, DIME  15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
115 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
 
 
VALIDATING A SOCIAL MODEL WARGAME: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GREEN COUNTRY MODEL 
 
 
Teresa M. Kinyon 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., California State Polytechnic University, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of 
 
 


























Robert F. Dell 
Chair, Department of Operations Research 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Most modern wargaming models are a simulation of large force-on-force conflicts, and 
are not capable of articulating social factors of the society being modeled. The Green 
Country Model (GCM) was established as a two-player wargame utilizing 
unconventional and irregular warfare tactics, taking in consideration the effects of social 
factors on the population and stability operations of the regions (winning the “hearts and 
minds” of a society). The game is not meant to offer predictions for a course of action or 
the impact of a course of action on the future, but to provide players, particularly those 
players who are leaders, a forum in which to discuss strategy, tactics and possible courses 
of action, thus improving the knowledge base and ability to “think outside the box” 
concerning various regions. Utilizing the concepts, input parameters, and underlying 
algorithms established by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, we build a 
simulation model to begin the validation process of the GCM. This model, which can run 
one action in thousandths of a second, will not only provide developers a framework for 
continued validation, but can provide users and policy makers training opportunities 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Green Country Model (GCM) developed at Johns Hopkins University-Applied 
Physics Lab (JHU-APL), was contrived to determine if the social aspects of a society 
could be incorporated into a wargame in order to simulate realistic outcomes of an event 
or action of a player whose opponents range from friendly to hostile. The game is not 
meant to offer predictions for a course of action or the impact of a course of action on the 
future, but to provide players, particularly those players who are leaders, a forum in 
which to discuss strategy, tactics and possible courses of action, thus improving the 
knowledge base and ability to “think outside the box” concerning various regions.   
The GCM is a vast model originally built on 19 intricately linked and embedded 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. With the current model, it takes about a day for the players 
and moderators to get through all the phases of the game. The game was built as a two-
player (or two-group) board game, with a simple Graphical User Interface (GUI), which 
projects maps and spreadsheet displays onto a screen in order that players can get a 
bigger picture of the game set-up. The analysis of several actions can take the moderators 
from one to two hours, depending on the actual number of actions the players selected.  
To speed up the process, we build a simulation model that utilizes random 
numbers to select all of the options that are normally chosen by the players. The 
spreadsheets and the embedded equations were analyzed, dissected and written into 
30,000 lines of Java code. The resulting model required no human input, and can run one 
action in thousandths of a second. In this thesis the random operations of the model (of 
which there are dozens) are all specified by random numbers generated from user-
selected distributions. In this way, we allow the model to be vastly more general, and 
useful for much more than simple two-group play. This should allow players, developers, 
analysts and policy makers the ability to assess and quantify the possible effects of 
choices (and the probability distributions of outcomes associated with those choices) in a 
way that has not been possible before this analysis.  
 xviii
The vast size and number of parameters in this model make it impossible to 
validate in one study. However, we believe that our study provides a good initiation into 
the validation process, and the framework developed could be utilized and built on, to run 
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Beginning with conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq (in particular, post-conflict 
operations) and various ungoverned African nations (e.g., Somalia), the United States 
Military has seen a transformation in its mission from conventional warfare to irregular 
and unconventional warfare. Irregular warfare (IW) is a struggle, often violent, among 
state and non-state actors, in an attempt to gain legitimacy and influence over the 
population’s beliefs  (Department of Defense [DoD] Directive 3000.07, 2007).   It 
emphasizes the use of irregular forces as well as indirect methods to defeat and or 
exhaust the enemy; tactics include attrition, exhaustion, and subversion, rather than direct 
force-on-force conventional confrontations (Larson, Eaton, Szayna, & Nichiporuk, 2009, 
p. xii). The Department of Defense is actively seeking innovative ways to deal with and 
combat irregular and unconventional warfare. One approach could be in the form of 
wargaming.   A wargame is a model or simulation not involving actual military forces, in 
which the flow of events is affected by, and in turn affects, decisions made during the 
course of those events by players representing opposing sides (Perla, 1990, p. 274).   
Most wargaming models are a simulation of large force-on-force conflicts, and 
are not capable of articulating social factors of the society. The Green Country Model 
(GCM) was established as a two-player wargame utilizing unconventional and irregular 
warfare tactics, taking in consideration the effects of social factors of the population and 
stability operations of the regions (winning the “hearts and minds” of a society).  
“Stability operations” have been suggested to be a key to the success of the U.S. military 
and irregular warfare.  “Stability operations” is defined by the Department of Defense as 
an overarching term that encompasses military missions, tasks and activities conducted 
outside the United States. Their objective is to reestablish or maintain a safe and secure 
environment, and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure 
and reconstruction, and humanitarian relief  (DoD 3000.05, 2009,  p. 1). 
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The GCM developed at Johns Hopkins University-Applied Physics Lab (JHU-
APL), was contrived to determine if the social aspects of a society could be incorporated 
into a wargame in order to simulate realistic outcomes of an event or action of a player 
whose opponents range from friendly to hostile. The game is not meant to offer 
predictions for a course of action or the impact of a course of action on the future, but to 
provide players, particularly those players who are leaders, a forum in which to discuss 
strategy, tactics and possible courses of action, thus improving the knowledge base and 
ability to “think outside the box” concerning various regions. This can, hopefully, 
improve their understanding and possibly aid in the decision-making process in the area 
of interest. The GCM has been utilized by numerous military and civilian groups, and has 
been through one verification effort, which studied and tested the analytic rigor of the 
model output (Simpkins, Ihde, & Haney, 2010, p. 3). As of 2012 there have been no 
attempts at validation or accreditation of the model. Verification is the process of 
determining that a model accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description 
and specifications. Validation is the process of determining the degree to which a model 
is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of its intended use(s) 
(DoD MIL-STD-3022, 2008, p. 3). Through the course of this study, the GCM will be 
analyzed on both a microscopic and macroscopic scale in order to provide a degree of 
validation and verification of the model and define its potential as a training tool. This 
process will ensure that future users understand the limitations of the model and what it 
can bring to the fight. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the construction and use of socio-behavioral models like the 
GCM is sparse. We have not found an extensive treatment of the gaming approach based 
on, for example, sociological or psychological principles. Available models are generated 
based on reasonable heuristics, but no such model appears to have been validated to any 
real degree.  
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In this section, we review some of the literature regarding the DoD requirements 
for simulation modeling, validation and verification. We briefly examine social models, 
as distinct from other types of models, and address the lack of an established process for 
validating them. 
1. Military Simulation, Verification and Validation Requirements 
The Department of Defense has documented a framework for the verification, 
validation and accreditation (VV&A) of models and simulations (DoD MIL-STD-3022, 
2009). This paper provides the definitions of verification, validation, modeling and model 
simulation as they apply to the DoD.   Additionally it provides an outline for the 
requirements for the verification and validation process. The document does not, though, 
prescribe specific steps required in these processes. This thesis incorporates some of the 
requirements necessary for a full validation of a DoD model. However, many of the 
requirements listed remain to be met, as this thesis provides only a portion of the 
validation and verification process of the GCM.   
DoD’s Directive 5000.59 (DoD 5000.59, 2007) is entitled “DoD Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) Management.”  This paper serves to address the issue of the 
importance of simulation models to the DoD and the goals of developing a simulation 
model:  “promoting visibility and accessibility of models and simulations; leading, 
guiding, and shepherding investments in M&S; assisting collaborative research, 
development, acquisition, and operation of models and simulations; maximizing 
commonality, reuse, interoperability, efficiencies an effectiveness of M&S, and 
supporting DoD Communities that are enabled by M&S” (DoD 5000.59, 2007, p. 2). It 
does not, however, provide specific guidelines for the practitioner. 
2. Social Models  
Pew and Mavor (1998) gives insight on what type of simulation models the 
military would be interested in utilizing. Although they mention behavior models 
specifically, the models available to them were quite different from the models of today. 
JHU-APL personnel developed the actual concepts and criteria of how they desired to 
model human behavior in GCM, but the implementation of GCM in this thesis was 
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developed using many of the concepts mentioned in Pew and Mavor (1998). For 
example, the ability to represent the behavior of individuals, as well as teams and larger 
organizations, was captured by giving the moderators the ability to change the amount of 
resources allotted to players. That is, the moderators can change the amount of power a 
player has, to ensure that player can only perform actions appropriate to that player’s skill 
level and influence.   
Pew and Mavor (1998) also emphasize the importance of a behavior model and its 
ability to represent real-world behavior under different conditions, which is part of the 
analysis process in this thesis.   The authors stress that there are many types of behavior 
models that are important to military users, including training simulations (whose users 
might be instructors or those being trained); mission rehearsal simulations (used by 
operational forces to prepare for specific missions); and analysis simulations (whose 
users might evaluate, for example, policy choices). The model built for this thesis is built 
to support users of all of these types of simulations.    
Pew and Mavor (1998) also list numerous human behavior models in use by the 
military as well as some of their limitations.   Interestingly enough, none of the models 
listed actually incorporate human behavior to the degree of the GCM. The authors note 
that what they call “human behavior in constructive wargaming models” incorporates 
human decisions by inserting a doctrinally based decision rule for what an individual 
ought to do; performance capacities and limitations are ignored. It goes on to state that 
human behavior models are in the infancy stage but are “badly needed” to create realistic 
and useful evaluations. (Pew & Mavor, 1998, p. 44). The GCM does not insert an actual 
pre-established behavior; it produces behavior data, in accordance with subject matter 
experts’ opinions, which result from an action. The next decision is then based on the 
resulting behavior.    
Alexander, Ross, Vinarskai and Farr (2012) emphasize the difficulties of 
incorporating social aspects in a computerized wargame.   They note: “for a wargame to 
be useful to the military, it must closely approximate as many of the elements of war as 
possible. Among the elements that are typically not modeled or are poorly modeled in 
nearly all military computer-based wargames are systematic effects, command and 
 5
control, intelligence, morale, training, and other human and political factors”  (Alexander 
et al., 2012, p. 94). “Strategies for achieving victory over an opponent often rely on 
adversely impacting the psychological and emotional state of that opponent. However, as 
previously mentioned, most simulations of warfare do not attempt to incorporate these 
soft factors and, instead, choose to model victory only by attrition”  (Alexander et al., 
2012, p. 95). The GCM’s goal is to successfully incorporate “soft” factors into a 
wargame. The goal of this thesis is to computerize the individual actions of the wargame 
in order to allow it to be run many times. This is turn can help us understand how the 
social factors interact and whether they are effectively capturing the behavior of a 
society. We use simulation to examine the behavior of the GCM when it is played 
repeatedly with differing choices. Because the GCM focuses on behavior and social 
aspects of a society, it is quite different from the usual simulation models of, for example, 
discrete events. There is an extensive literature on this sort of simulation (for example, 
Kelton, Sadiwski, and Sadowski, 1998, describe a number of modeling approaches using 
a particular piece of software).  
A number of social models appear to be being built, but very few seem to be 
widely used, perhaps because of the difficulty in validating them. One recent effort at 
validation comes from Marlin (2009), who used the Peace Support Operations Model 
PSOM model as a starting point for a simulation of a specific mission in Iraq. He 
attempted to validate the PSOM using designed experiments together with simulation in 
an effort to run real-world scenarios, with an analysis of the data focused on three 
doctrinally essential measures of effectiveness (obtained from the local Sunni population) 
provided by PSOM in an Iraq based scenario. Our thesis is different in that it is not based 
on a real-world scenario; in fact, that would be the logical next step for the GCM 
simulation model.   The GCM simulation model we built removes the human-in-the-loop 
requirement, and allows for multiple potential outcomes in order to detect anomalies and 
examine the variability of results.  
 6
3. Validation of a Social Model 
The validation of a social model is largely undefined. There are numerous 
ongoing attempts to build an adequate, useful social model. However, the lack of an 
accepted validation process for these models continues to impede universal acceptance of 
any of them. Goerger (2004) set out to examine the extent to which human behavior 
models can be validated. He notes that validating physics-based models is well-defined 
using long-established standards. However, the process of validating behavioral models is 
not as well-defined. The validation process developed, matured, and refined over time for 
physics-based models is not well suited for validating behavioral models (Goerger, S.R. 
2004, p. 2). 
In this thesis we validate not the computerized simulation model, which acts as a 
“wrapper” for GCM, but the GCM’s ability to realistically represent the expected results 
of human actions in a society. While it is difficult to represent the “change in affinity 
between action requestor and government as a result of an action,” for example, in a 
mathematically precise way, our results indicate the model produces changes in the 
expected direction and of reasonable size. The model created in this thesis is a tool that 
was developed to study thousands of simulations of the GCM and to provide a framework 
in order to analyze the output. The literature review on this topic has demonstrated the 
enormous need for such a model, as well as the shortfalls and lack of validated models in 
existence. Army Colonel Wm. Forrest Crain has said that “The reason those [existing 
social] models didn’t work was because they couldn’t properly simulate human behavior. 
The next generation of simulations will need to address the ‘representation’ of human 
behavior…we’ve barely scratched the surface” (quoted in Erwin, S.I., 2000, p. 1). This 
thesis is based on requirements set forth in numerous DoD publications on validation and 
verification as well as the military requirements desired for a social model that can 
capture human behavior as it parallels real life events, thus aiding in the training and the 
decision making process.    
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C. BACKGROUND 
The United States military must maintain the ability to fight a large-scale 
traditional war; however, its mission now encompasses fighting small-scale 
unconventional wars in highly divergent societies.   The difference between the two types 
of warfare is that in traditional warfare the objective is to defeat an adversary’s forces, 
destroy its war-making capacity and seize or retain territory in order to force a change in 
an adversary’s government or policies (DoD, 2007, p. 19). The United States invasion of 
Iraq, where the goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and establish a new 
government is an example of this type of warfare. Irregular warfare encompasses 
unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare’s spectrum of military and paramilitary 
operations are normally of long duration, and conducted through, with or by indigenous 
or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by an 
external source. It includes guerrilla warfare, sabotage, intelligence activities and assisted 
recovery (DoD, 2007, p. 19). Current activities of United States forces in Afghanistan can 
be considered unconventional warfare; it is a conflict directed against non-state actors, 
not the country of Afghanistan.   Traditional warfare has been well documented and 
modeled over the years; this is not the case for unconventional warfare, which has 
emerged as the dominant type of warfare only over the last ten years.   The National 
Military Strategy of the United States of America, signed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen in 2011, suggests the changes that the United States 
military needs to undergo and in fact begins to address how the United States can fight 
unconventional wars. He emphasizes the theory of utilizing the strength of our military, 
specifically its strong leadership, adaptive diplomacy, and ability to evolve to reach its 
maximum capacity of power in defense of our national interests.   The military should, 
according to Mullen, leverage its forward presence and focusing on building 
relationships, supporting host nation values and utilizing military capabilities to deepen 
security ties and act as a security guarantor. These tactics will aid in preventing attacks 
against the U.S., strengthen our international and regional security and prepare us to deter 
and defeat aggression, either alone or with partners and allies  (Mullen, 2011, p. 1).   
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In these constrained fiscal times, the DoD is continuing to seek out cost-saving 
initiatives in the area of training, and are encouraged in DoD Directive 1322.18 to utilize 
alternative methods to improve training while still remaining as efficient and effective as 
possible:  “[m]embers of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent 
possible, timely and effective individual, collective, and staff training, conducted in a safe 
manner, to enable performance to standard during operations. Live training resources 
shall be sustained through good stewardship, public outreach, comprehensive planning, 
and the leveraging of advanced technologies. Training realism shall be maximized 
through use of the live training domain supplemented by integrated virtual and 
constructive capabilities. Cultural awareness and language training shall be embedded in 
accession training, professional military education, and pre-deployment training and 
integrated across the Total Force” (DoD Directive 1322.18, 2009, pp.  2 and 3). This 
directive continues on, encouraging new technologies and innovative thinking in order to 
accomplish its goals. The DoD shall “[c]oordinate with the experimentation and test 
communities to anticipate and implement training capabilities supporting new or 
improved war-fighting capabilities” (DoD Directive 1322.18, 2009, p. 7). Human 
dynamic models on a national scale could be the answer the DoD has been seeking; these 
are high-quality models that could improve the nation’s ability to manage social and 
political conflicts. A successful, realistic model could assist in winning 
counterinsurgency battles, improve peacekeeping missions, provide better understanding 
of asymmetric warfare and its impact on social values and possibly even prevent conflicts 
before they begin. Such a model could be utilized by leaders, both military and civilian, 
to understand adversaries and civilian populations, thus improving how the military 
conducts business as well as possibly improving research, establish policy, and conduct 
training  (Bos, Greenberg, Kopecky, Ihde, & Simpkins, 2011, p. 1).   Johns Hopkins 
University Applied Physics lab developed the GCM in an attempt to capture the effects of 
social influence and affinity on a region and its people. It attempts to demonstrate how 
civilian or military forces can take actions that will impact not just the people of the 
region, but its politics, military, economy, social empathy, media, and infrastructure. This 
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thesis provides some validation and verification of the model, and in doing so answers 
some critical questions concerning the model’s parameters.    
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
 What individual parameters are required and how are they captured in the 
model? What are the current and programmed capabilities of the 
parameters?   
 What parameters are needed for the model to perform accurately? 
 What is the desired outcome?  What are the minimum essential tasks to 
perform in order to accomplish the mission or achieve effects, under what 
conditions, and to what performance standards? 
 What are the gaps, shortfalls, or redundancies that exist in the model, 
under the identified conditions, compared to the identified performance 
standards? 
 What are the intended parameter interactions and does output data from 
the GCM verify performance? How does factor significance and 
weighting affect results? 
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The focus of this study is to provide model some validation and verification for a 
wargame which could assist in examining scenarios pertaining to unconventional and 
irregular warfare prior to actual “boots on ground” military action. With continuing 
financial constraints this model could provide tactical experience, test practices and 
procedures and develop emergent concepts of possible volatile operations at 
comparatively low monetary and human costs. 
F. METHODOLOGY  
In order to completely understand and determine a model’s value, capabilities and 
effectiveness it requires thorough Validation and Verification. This study serves to 
provide a portion of the validation process and will help to assess the capabilities of the 
GCM and its ability to deliver effective training, planning and course of action analysis to 
its users. Verification requires an analysis of the relationship affinities of the input 
parameters, and whether the model produces realistic and accurate outputs. In this study 
numerous simulations of the possible actions were examined; quantitative analysis was 
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conducted on the effects of those alterations in parameters. The GCM is a vast model 
originally built on 19 intricately linked and embedded Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. 
With the current model, it takes about a day for the players and moderators to get through 
all the phases of the game, which are explained in detail in the following chapters.   The 
game was built as a two-player (or two-group) board game, with a simple Graphical User 
Interface (GUI), which projects maps and spreadsheet displays onto a screen in order that 
players can get a bigger picture of the game set-up. The players would spend the morning 
analyzing the data and deciding which actions to take in order to meet their objectives. 
Once the players decided on a way forward the information was passed to the moderators 
who, according to the developers, would utilize the nineteen spreadsheets to analyze the 
results. This analysis could take from one to two hours, depending on the number of 
actions the players selected. The moderators would then return the results to the players, 
who would decide whether to proceed with selected actions or cancel and select new 
ones.   The entire process was very human-intensive, and players could end up taking 
several hours waiting for the moderators to come up with all the calculations and 
conclusions for one to two rounds of actions selected by the players. Validating this 
model would be nearly impossible simply due to the time required to produce results 
based on spreadsheets.  
To speed up the process we build a simulation model that utilizes random 
numbers to select all of the options that are normally chosen by the players. The 
spreadsheets and the embedded equations were analyzed, dissected and written into 
30,000 lines of Java code.   The resulting model required no human input, and could run 
1,000 simulations of a single action and provide output results in less than 30 seconds. In 
this thesis all of the random operations of the model (of which there are dozens) are all 
specified by random numbers generated from user-selected distributions. In this way we 
allow the model to be vastly more general, and useful for much more than simple two-
group play. 
Although the object of the game is to provide training and analysis to the users, 
the object of the model is to analyze the options and show the validity of the game. 
Through this model we can understand the relationships of the input parameters and 
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variables and the effects of changing these parameters. Additionally, utilizing the output 
of the model the effectiveness of the underlying mathematical algorithms can be 
examined. This verification allows the developers to obtain insight on the possible range 
of inputs and the acceptable corresponding outputs. The model could assist game players 
in testing different combinations of actions quickly and efficiently. The focus of this 
study was to analyze the output of a single action, in order to provide some validation 
that the game’s performance and subject matter expert data. The Subject Matter Experts 
(SME) data (used as input parameters) was obtained from historical events, trends or 
conditions identified in the data obtained from the Afrobarometer website 
(http://www.afrobarometer.org/) surveys of the Nigerian people, is accurately reflected 
by the game. However, we have provided a general framework under which hypotheses 
can be evaluated and the effects of actions assessed. Throughout the process we were 
able to determine possible capability gaps, shortfalls and redundancies of the model and 
provide feedback to the developers. 
To recap, in this thesis we provide a simulation-based front-end to the GCM that 
allows developers to simulate thousands of plays of the game, under general conditions 
determined by distributions of random numbers that are entirely under the control of the 
user. This should allow players, developers, analysts and policy makers the ability to 
assess and quantify the possible effects of choices (and the probability distributions of 
outcomes associated with those choices) in a way that has not been possible before now. 
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II. GREEN COUNTRY MODEL BACKGROUND 
A. BACKGROUND 
The GCM is a competitive wargame that simulates the effects of soft factors in a 
social environment. Soft factors are the social interactions and interrelations of a local 
society and include such things as the population’s beliefs, attitudes, disposition and 
ambience. The GCM attempts to incorporate the social entities of soft factors into an 
analytic game in order to explore shifting social empathy and interactions in close 
geographic regions and their associated constituents.   
Currently in its third version, with a request pending for funding for further 
development, the GCM utilizes Diplomatic, Intelligence/Information, Military and 
Economic parameters to explore the Political, Military, Economic Social, Infrastructure, 
and Information rubric, which is explained in more detail below. The model was 
originally assembled to represent the country of Nigeria in a closed-form representation 
of the behavior and interactions of the population. It has since expanded to “games” 
representing regions of Central America (requested by U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND). 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and is a major exporter of oil to the United 
States, as well as an emerging economic and commodity market for China and other 
international powers. Nigeria was chosen based on its strategic importance as well as its 
complexity, a complexity that includes internal conflicts, active insurgency in the 
southern region of the country, and ethnic and religious tensions that affect national 
politics, all of which make an interesting sociocultural model (Bos et al., 2011, p. 2). 
B. SPECIFICATIONS AND CAPABILITES OF GCM 
The GCM addresses a comprehensive environment where players engage in 
combat that involves social situations and tactics against opposing individuals, units or 
regions, selecting the best tactics and strategic procedures to accomplish a predetermined 
mission or goal. The game players (collectively called actors) are represented in three 
ways; the red player (the enemy or opponent), the blue player (usually the U.S, or “good 
guy”) and Non-Player Actors (NPA). The actors can be represented on many different 
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levels:  national, international or local; and they can be a single person or group. The 
object of the game is for the blue player to try to accomplish an assigned objective 
through game play, while a red player opposes him or her in the quest and NPAs assist or 
deter the blue player’s chosen actions. Players can be simply rivals or can be 
unequivocally opposed to each other. Additionally, they can chose to be strategic partners 
in order to accomplish objectives on both sides. Players work as a team, and may or may 
not choose to become allies or even cooperate with opposing players. The focus of the 
team lies in the agreement of accomplishing assigned goals. This aspect of game play 
brings in the human dynamics of real-life experiences, tactics and strategy of the 
individual players, as well as teamwork.  
NPAs are entities not represented by actual players and are controlled by the 
game’s “artificial intelligence” (underlying algorithms). These players can be such things 
as ethnic tribes, political parties, state and local governments, Non-Government 
Organizations (NGOs), religious groups or criminal organizations. NPAs are an 
important aspect of the game and are part of the moderator’s response to a player’s 
gaming. Interaction with a single NPA, or group of NPAs, is in response to an action or 
response selected by the players as progress is made through the game scenario towards 
an objective. NPAs can represent any individual or groups based on the theme of the 
gaming scenario. The actions and responses of the NPAs are programmed into the 
scenario using real-life examples and have been pre-determined by the Johns Hopkins 
SME:  they are used in working with and coordinating operations with allies, ethnic 
groups, etc. Individual players, or teams, may or may not be skilled at a sufficiently high 
level of competence to accomplish a given task or goal, so interactions with the NPAs 
can be essential for success to be achieved; players can also be forced into a cooperative 
alliance.   
Red and blue players play the game through the process of taking actions from a 
pre-determined list of realistic options for this region of play, a list that was established 
by the SMEs. The entire list of actions is made available to the players at the outset of the 
game. Players’ choices are limited by the amount of resources available to them and in 
some cases may be constrained by other game conditions, which are discussed later. 
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Many game actions impact not only the players taking the action, but also the regions, 
and the NPAs associated with an action as well as the NPAs associated with a region. 
The game has no predefined victory conditions; players are assigned a strategic or 
specific goal, which is appropriate to the player, and the level at which the players have 
chosen to play at (e.g., United States government, terrorist group, leadership of Exxon 
Mobil, local vigilante group, etc.)  An objective can be chosen by the player in attempt to 
plan and research possible alternatives, or can be assigned by the moderators of the game. 
The game ends either after a predetermined number of turns have elapsed or when a 
player meets his or her objectives. In this thesis, the objective, which are based on real-
life events, is assigned by the moderator. The model results are compared to the results of 
the real-life events to determine the degree of accuracy that the model can reflect.   The 
game moderator sets gaming objectives for the player or team of players. Such objectives 
can be concise and exact, giving the player exact goals needed to complete the scenario, 
or they might be to develop or expand strategic or operational doctrine already 
established in today’s military organizations. To be able to meet such a widely varying 
objective list, the gaming platform needs to be developed as an adaptive modeled game, 
highly responsive to human decision-making processes that result in frequent changing of 
options and situations. 
C. GAME PLAY SET-UP  
Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Lab developed the GCM to 
incorporate and adapt to “human in the loop” game play. This type of game play is 
extremely dynamic and needs to accommodate human decision-making processes, which 
are difficult to predict or emulate. In order to incorporate human dynamics the developers 
introduced “interagency operations and collaborations” into the game play. As Simpkins 
et al. (2010) say, “[t]he GCM is a high-level, stochastic, multisided competitive influence 
game. It is especially useful at modeling interagency operations because the majority of 
its attention is given to soft power such as diplomacy, intelligence, information 
operations, civil affairs and economics.”  A key element of interagency operations is the 
players’ interactions with the NPAs. Directed by the game’s artificial intelligence, the 
NPAs may or may not cooperate with a player, and this decision of the NPA to cooperate 
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or not is based on the relationship (affinity) with the player as well as the NPAs perceived 
self-interest (Simpkins et al., 2010, p. 3). By utilizing interagency collaboration, the 
model is attempting to follow the theory that the whole of combined actions is greater 
than the sum of individual actions. The decision to use collaboration in the model was 
based on the vastly complicated task of trying to predict the impacts of responsive 
actions, as some result in immediate consequences and others have consequences that are 
not realized for years (Simpkins et al., 2010, p. 1). The game play is broken into several 
phases.   The information for these phases was obtained from a collaboration of 
references:  Simpkins et al. (2010), Schloman et al. (2010) and Bos et al. (2011). The 
phases are further broken down into the activities and status of the players, moderators 
and the model activities. Each of the next five subsections previews the phases of the 
game and describes the activities of the players, the moderators and the model that take 
place in that phase. 
1. Status Review Phase  
Players:   The moderator provides the players the value of their affinities, and  
resources, which includes the amount of Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, and 
Economic points they are entitled to, as well as the value of their characteristics which 
are represented in the forms of hubris and influence points. Additionally, players are able 
to view the game map, which is divided into regions, as well as the Political, Military, 
Economic, Intelligence and infrastructure (PMESII) values allocated to each region. Blue 
players and red players are separated and conduct their game plays separately. 
Moderators:   Monitor player activities. 
Model:  No action. 
2. Action Selection and Negotiation (Planning) Phase 
Players:   Select actions from the action table, based on the amount of resources 
they have available to them. Players cannot select actions, which they do not have enough 
resources to cover. Players may request permission or request a proxy action from NPA’s 
during this phase of the game. 
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Moderators:  Monitor player activities. 
Model:  No action. 
3. Adjustment Phase 
Players:  No action. 
Moderators:  Obtain results of permission and proxy request responses calculated 
by the model, and relay results to players by altering  one or all of the requesting player’s 
resources, affinity, hubris, the region PMESII, or NPA’s resources, affinity or hubris.   
Model:  Calculate non-player actor responses to the permission or proxy requests 
by players. 
4. Action Results  (Reallocation) Phase 
Players:  Upon receiving the results of the permission or proxy request, players 
finalize, alter or even cancel their actions and the turns are executed. If the players decide 
to cancel the action they can build a new action with their remaining resources; however 
they may not request another proxy or permission at this stage in the game. 
Moderators:  Monitor player activities, possibly choosing to inject new actions for 
NPA for the scenario if appropriate.   
Model:  No action. 
5. Adjudication Phase 
 Players:  No action. 
Moderator:  Evaluate the results of the model following submission of the player 
actions. Modify the game state data as appropriate.   
Model:  Executes the final actions, computes the results and applies them to 
player resources, regional status and affinity. Additionally executes various supporting 
algorithms for determining and updating trade, player-to-player affinity, regional PMESII 
scores, etc. 
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6. 1. Game Components 
The next six subsections are a list of components that make up the game and are 
the pre-determined aspects that are given to players at the beginning of the status review 
phase. 
a. Actions 
The players are provided a list of actions, pre-established by a SME. These 
actions are selected by the player on their turn and submitted in the action selection phase 
of the game. Each action is associated with a “cost” which is represented in points 
allotted to four categories:  Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, and Economic (DIME). 
These four categories represent the power that the player has to select and make an 
action. If the player does not have enough points to cover the cost of an action then that 
action cannot be selected. The success or failure is determined by the roll of three six-
sided dice, and the addition and subtraction of roll modifiers. The modifiers are based on 
four factors; the first three are affinity, hubris and influence scores of the player, the 
NPA, and the ethnic groups associated with each region. The PMESII scores of the 
region where the player has decided to take action determine the last modifier. Affinity, 
hubris, influence, PMESII, and DIME are described in more detail below. 
b. Affinity, Hubris and Influence 
Affinity is a value that represents the level of friendship between any two 
actors, player to player or player to NPA. Affinity influences the relationship(s) of the 
actor’s characteristics and how they interact and relate to other actors in the region where 
the player has decided to take action. Affinity can be manifested as either Positive or 
Negative. Positive affinity promotes positive interactions with the NPA, which in turn 
results in an action being more likely to be successful and aids in progressing toward the 
scenario goals. Negative Affinity will require the player, or team, to provide incentives 
and negotiations that could lead to the NPA cooperating to attain the scenario goals. 
Negative Affinity can also play out in a hostile or negative reaction by the NPAs.    
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Hubris represents the pride, arrogance and haughtiness of a player (all 
actors have hubris). In this game hubris is a direct reflection of the resentment generated 
by a player for conducting unilateral, forceful actions on his or her turn. Hubris points 
accumulate through each turn, and can reduce or improve the likelihood of cooperation 
from NPA players.   
Influence represents the players’ status in the game, and is a reflected by 
respect or fear of the player by the other players. High influence scores will result in 
more cooperation from the other players and reduces the possibility of negative actions 
taken against the player. 
c. Ethnic Groups 
Ethnic groups play the role of NPAs; they impact the results of a play with 
their affinity, influence and hubris scores. When a player shares a strong positive affinity 
with an NPA, the player will be able to utilize the NPA’s influence and hubris values to 
their advantage to complete an action. In contrast, a negative infinity will have a negative 
impact on the player’s results. This is especially important when players are requesting 
permission or proxies on their turns. There are two types of NPAs associated with each 
ethnic group.   The first is the ethnic group as a whole that occupies a region. Each ethnic 
group in the game is assigned an affinity score in the each region as well as an affinity 
score with the blue and red players and all other NPAs. The second type of NPA 
associated with the ethnic group is the “kingpin” NPA in each region. This is the NPA 
ethnic group that has the most impact in that region and is based on the affinity scores. 
The NPA with the highest affinity of any ethnic group in a region is essentially the 
“kingpin” of the region. 
d. Regions 
A map of the area of game play is divided up by into zones determined by the 
subject matter experts (SME) and then assigned PMESII values based on the real-world 
situation of each region. The size and composition of a region is dependent on the over-
arching desires of the customer. However, once a particular game map is divided up into 
regions, the regions remain the same for every scenario. The PMESII values change after 
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each turn of either the blue player or the red player and reflect the success or failure of an 
action as appropriate. However, the values are reset to the original values established by 
the SME, each time a new scenario is started.   The ideal size for this game is 5–10 
regions, and they can cover a city, a province or a country as in the case of Nigeria in this 
study.  
e. Game Map  
The Game Map provides the players with a visual reference to the game’s 
objective and represents the gaming area divided into appropriate detail to meet the 
scenario parameters. Areas can be as small as a city block or as large as national borders 
in the wargame arena. Gaming parameters are set so that each geographic area or region 
will have set values based on a variety of elements:  Politics (P), Military (M) prowess, 
Economic (E) and Social (S) status, Information (I) accessibility, and Infrastructure (I) of 
the target and surrounding areas. There may be some “spillover” effects from 
neighboring regions that slightly impact the values in a region, but generally the PMESII 
values in the regions remain constant, unless changed as a result of a turn. These 
elements will drive NPA actions during game in response to player actions and whether 
or not the NPA believes the action will result in self-benefit. 
f. Facilities 
Facilities (permanent structures such as military bases, embassies etc.) are 
indicators of a player’s substantial long-term presence in a region. Facilities carry with 
them resource bonuses, indicating a player’s increased capability to operate because of 
his presence in the region. Facilities may also provide increased likelihood of success for 
actions of the same resource type as the facility.  
Facilities are aligned with the instruments of power they represent.  
A Diplomatic (D) facility represents an embassy. It provides three 
Diplomatic resource points per turn to the owning player as well as an increased chance 
of success for Diplomatic actions taking place in that region.  
 21
An Intelligence (I) facility represents a CIA station or other intelligence 
center. It provides three intelligence resource points per turn and gives a bonus for 
intelligence activities in the region. Intelligence facilities may be covert. 
A small Military (M) facility may be a training camp or special operations 
outpost. It may be covert. Small military facilities provide an additional three points per 
turn. A large military facility represents a large military base. It provides ten military 
resource points per turn.  
An Economic (E) facility represents a factory or other production 
complex. It provides three additional economic points to the owning player per turn and 
improves the likelihood of success for any economic action undertaken in the region.  
Facilities may be overt or covert. Covert facilities provide the owning 
player resource bonuses and applicable die roll modifiers but are not shown on the map 
unless discovered. An opponent’s facilities may be discovered through Intelligence 
actions. 
Facilities may be attacked. Successful attacks remove the facility from the 
map and end all bonuses they provide the owning player. Facilities are protected by the 
local military; the player may also assign additional security. 
The owning player may voluntarily remove any facility at no cost. 
Removed facilities will no longer provide resources or die roll bonuses. 
D. CRITICAL PARAMETERS AND SETTINGS 
Note:  The below values and explanations are taken from the Johns Hopkins 
White Paper, written by the developers of the game S.D. Simpkins, and Alex Ihde. This 
white paper is an unpublished informal game manual for the GCM. The parameters in 
this section are critical to understand as these values are what are analyzed during the 
verification and validation process. (White Paper, Simpkins & Ihde, 2010) 
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1. Conversions 
Numerous parameters are scored on a value that ranges from less than െ100 to 
greater than 100 within the underlying algorithms of the game’s artificial intelligence.   
However, these values are converted to numbers ranging from negative three to 
three, in order to make the game play less complex for players. Table 1 is a general scale 
that applies to the PMESII values in a region. 






– 3  < – 100 Completely ineffective 
– 2 – 41 to – 99 Mostly ineffective 
– 1 – 10 to – 40 Poor 
0 – 9 to 10 Neutral 
1 10 to 40 Moderate 
2 41 to 99 Effective 
3 > 100 Outstanding 
2. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure 
(PMESII)   
 
a. Political (P) 
This parameter reflects the effectiveness of the government.   Political 
effectiveness impacts the flow of information, defense forces, law enforcement and the 
overall economy of a region. A low reported score (–3) indicates absolute corruption and 
ineffectiveness on the part of the government. A high score (3) indicates an honest 
government that facilitates progress of local programs and businesses. 
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b. Military – Regional (M) 
This parameter represents the region’s militia and law enforcement 
effectiveness. Of note, local M values may be increased through training. This value is 
driven by the readiness and capability of the local law enforcement, or national military. 
Generally it does not carry over from region to region but there may be a small amount of 
spillover from neighboring regions along the borders. A low reported score (–3)  
indicates a completely ineffective militia and law enforcement, which cannot defend 
itself or control violence.   A high score (3) indicates a high military readiness, and the 
region’s law enforcement and military components can defend and prevent terrorists and 
violence in that area. 
c. Economic (E) 
This parameter reflects the per capita income of the region. Low economic 
scores indicate a region in trouble and unable to sustain its population. High scores 
indicate a prosperous region. 
d. Social (S) 
This parameter reflects the contentedness of the population in the region. 
A low score indicates social unrest, whereas a high score indicates a content and peaceful 
population. 
e. Information (I) 
This parameter reflects the media penetration of the region, and indicates 
the ability for information to reach members of the society directly and quickly. Also 
under this category is literacy of the population, and the prevalence of wireless 
communication devices, television, radio and Internet. Regions with high scores are more 
susceptible to Information Operation campaigns. 
 24
f. Infrastructure (I) 
This parameter reflects the state of the of the physical infrastructure of the 
region, including roads, rails, bridges, port cargo handling, air services, electricity and 
potable water. Poor infrastructure slows growth and economic progress. 
3. Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economic (DIME) 
Points (or “resource points”) are given to each player in the form of the DIME 
rubric: Diplomacy, Intelligence and Information, Military and Economic (finance). All 
actors possess resources expressed in the form of points that enable them to pursue their 
goals, in the case of the blue and red players, and in the case of the NPAs to perform 
within game parameters. As the actors progress through a turn, they may only select 
actions for which they have sufficient resources to cover:  A player cannot exceed the 
level of effort set by the points.   Unless impacted by an action, the player’s resources are 
reset at the beginning of each turn, and remain constant until the end of the game. Once 
an action results in a decrease or increase of a player’s DIME scores that new value 
becomes the new level of effort available to the player until the end of the game. 
Resource points affect the players’ and NPAs’ abilities to perform actions that will 
advance them toward the desired game objectives. Affinity, hubris and influence run in 
conjunction with players’ DIME resources, often progressing in parallel. 
a. Diplomacy 
This parameter represents the personal interactions among actors. 
Diplomacy is used to communicate with other players and helps to increase or decrease 
affinity. Diplomacy points are used to take Diplomatic actions, and are helpful when 
requesting permission to act in a region controlled by an NPA, or to request an NPA to 
conduct an action on behalf of a player, known as a proxy in this game.  
b. Intelligence 
This parameter represents the attempt to gain or disseminate strategic 
information. Intelligence points cover two kinds of action:  intelligence gathering and 
information operations. Intelligence gathering may provide the player with game 
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information not otherwise available. For example, HUMINT (human-sourced 
intelligence) may provide the player with information regarding an NPA’s affinity level 
with other NPAs in the game, the level of resources available to each NPA and actions 
the NPA plans to take. Information Operations (IO)  are attempts by the player to change 
affinity or influence values in the game. IO may be used to either raise or lower the 
affinity value between two actors or to raise or lower an actor’s influence value. 
c. Military (Players) 
This parameter represents the military resources available to a player. 
Military and law enforcement forces are usually focused on actions involving force. 
Military points represent the commitment of military units or other resources such as a 
logistics capability or missiles fired from offshore. Military units may attack, conduct 
peacekeeping missions, conduct training and do other things normally performed by 
military units. 
d. Economic 
This parameter represents economic resources and consists of economic 
and financial efforts.  
4. Action Outcomes 
Action outcomes are determined through a roll of three six-sided dice, yielding 
totals from three to eighteen. These numbers are modified based on influencing factors as 
identified on the action table. Results vary based on the adjusted value of the dice. 
Generally, higher numbers yield results more favorable to the player than low numbers. 
A ‘natural three’ always yields a poor result, while a ‘natural eighteen’ always produces a 
favorable result. Any other result is modified by influencing factors, with the adjusted 
number indicating the outcome for an action that a player selects from the actions table. 
a. Influencers 
(1) Region. Conditions in a region are expressed as PMESII 
scores,  High (3 or 2) and low (–3 or –2)  PMESII scores influence the outcome of an 
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action by modifying the value of the dice roll that determines the success of an action. 
Regional influences capture the limitations of poor infrastructure, and may impose 
penalties on an otherwise profitable economic program.   
(2) Player. A player’s hubris and influence characteristics can 
also influence the outcome of selected actions. Additionally, a player’s strength in terms 
of one or more resources may influence the die roll value. 
(3) Target. The target actor’s characteristics are also important 
to the outcome of an action. Besides hubris, influence, and affinity, the target’s 
capabilities (DIME values) can affect the action outcomes. For example a target with a 
powerful military is less likely to succumb to force than a target without military 
capabilities.  
(4) Total. All influencing values are summed and the result is 
applied to the die roll. This modified result determines the outcome of the action. 
b. Effects  
After applying modifications to the action die roll, an effect is generated. 
The effect may impact the actor, the target and the region in which the action took place.  
(1) Actor. The actor may be a player or an NPA that undertook 
the action at the player’s request via a proxy. Actor effects include adjustments to hubris, 
influence and affinity (both actor-target and actor-region) scores, as well as possible 
consequences to the actor’s DIME resources. 
(2) Region. Certain actions may produce consequences to the 
region in which they are undertaken. Warfare may destroy the infrastructure, the 
economy or even the social fabric of the region. Aid given to starving people may 
increase consumer confidence and quiet unrest. Effects may linger beyond the turn on 
which they are imposed.  
(3) Target. Some actions can produce consequences to their 
intended target. This may be true of benevolent actions such as economic aid or disaster 
relief, or of harmful actions such as military strikes or negative propaganda campaigns. 
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c. Victory  
The game ends when the player has met the goals set by the game 
moderator or when the player or players, have completed the predetermined number of 
turns. In the event the game is ended due to a predetermined number of turns, whereby 
the player’s progress toward objectives will be evaluated to determine success or failure.      
E. UNDERLYING GAME MECHANICS 
Note:  The following ten pages are the underlying mathematical models of the 
GCM taken directly from the paper written by the developers of the game, “The 
Application of National Power:  A DIME-PMESII parametric game,” by S.D. Simpkins, 
A.G. Ihde, and M.P. Haney (Simpkins et al., 2010.)  This article explains each of the 
equations utilized in the underlying infrastructure of the game, which is what provides the 
artificial intelligence of the game. Additionally the paper provides an essential short 
verification (using MATLAB) of each of the equation in order to understand the behavior 
of the equation. This was an important study, which the developers used to ensure that 
the underlying algorithms were performing as expected. 
There are six mathematical algorithms used in the model, which rely on a 
common set of indices: 
 Let i, j ∈ R, the set of Regions {R1,…,Rk} where k is the maximum number 
of regions in the game, and i, j are the regions targeted by the action. 
 Let m, n ∈ S, the set of Regional attributes {PMESII} where p. represents 
the last regional attribute. 
 Let t ∈ T, game turns {1, …, TI} planned, where I is the planned number of 
game turns 
 Let x, y∈ A, the set of Actions {A1,…,Az} where z is the number of possible 
actions 
 Let a, b, c ∈ P, the set of Actors {P1, …, Pd} where d is the number of 
actors in the game, a is the actor, b is the target, and c is the requesting 
player. 
 Let f, g ∈ F, the set of Facilities {F1 – Fh} where h is the number of facility 
types in the game, and f and g represent the facilities in the region. 
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 Let q, r ∈ C, the set of Characteristics and Resources {Hubris, Influence, 
DIME} where s is the last characteristic in the set. 
1. Permissions/Proxy 
A player has three choices when selecting an action. The first choice is to ask 
permission for the action from the regional leader (an NPA). The second choice is to ask 
another NPA to complete the action via proxy, and lastly the player can choose to take 
the action without asking permission or via proxy. This decision takes place in the Action 
Selection and Negotiation phase.   Permission is granted based on a random number and 
the addition or subtraction of modifying factors.    If the sum of the random number and 
the modifier is greater than the permission threshold, then the permission is granted, and 
the actor can proceed with the action, with permission from the regional leader without 
penalty. If permission is not granted and the player decides to continue with the action, 
then the player may receive a hubris penalty, which is added (the higher the hubris the 
more arrogant) to his or her hubris total following the execution of the play. The 
developers inserted the random number to add an element of chance to the game, to 
reflect the reality that international diplomacy may often produce unexpected results. 
Additionally, SMEs determined a set of weighting factors, which were bound to the 
model in order to improve game play and produce more realistic results. The following 
weights apply 
 τ1 = weight for benefit of hearer  (regional leader) 
 τ2 = weight for target (player affected by the action) consequence 
 τ3 = weight of target fear 
 τ4 = weight of leader affinity to requesting player 
 τ5 = weight of leader fear of requesting player 
 τ6 = weight of hubris of requesting player 
 
The following is provided for the below equation (which calculates the value 
which will be compared to the permission threshold):   
a = the leader;  b = target; c = requesting player   where (a, b, c ∈ P) 
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Benefita, Benefitb, Benefitc is the impact from the action on actor a or target b. 
This value is calculated based on the whether the benefit is for the regional 
leader, the target or the actor taking the action, c.    
Affinitya,b,  Affinitya,c is the affinity between players a and b or players a and c 
Influencea , Influenceb  is the influence attributed to player a and b respectively. 
Feara,b, Feara,c   is the amount of fear between the actors. It is based on the 
amount of influence that each actor possesses.  
Self-Benefit represents the importance that the benefit to the leader carries 
compared to the benefit to other actors (corresponds to the affinity value) 




If the value is greater than the permission threshold (established by SME) then 
player c is granted permission to take requested action. 
The components of Permission Equation are:   
[τ1 * Benefita * Self Benefit] which represents the impact on the leader. This is 
probably the most influential of the components, because if the action is 
beneficial to the leader then he or she is more likely to grant permission.  
[τ2 * Benefitb * Affinitya,b] which represents the impact on the target. This is a 
modifier that multiplies the potential benefit to the target by the affinity he 
or she shares with the target. In other words, an action that benefits the 
leader is likely to be approved then an action that will not benefit the 
leader.    
[τ3 * Benefitb * Feara,b]  which represents the leader’s fear of the target. In this 
game if the target’s influence score is greater than the leader’s influence 
score by 10 points, then the leader will fear the target.   
[τ4 * Affinitya,c] which represents the leader’s affinity with the player requesting 
the permission or proxy. A greater affinity should result in a greater 
willingness to grant permission. 
[τ5  * Feara,c] which represents the leaders fear of requesting player. 
[τ6 * Hubrisc] which gives the requesting player’s hubris. 
 
Random # 1 * Benefita *SelfBenefit   2 * Benefitb * Affinitya,b  
 3 * Benefitb * feara,b    4 * Affinitya,c    5 * feara,c    6 * Hubrisc   Threshold
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The same equation is used for a request for a proxy action, except that in this case 
the leader applies a benefit value of one. Again, if the value of the expression is greater 
than the SME predetermined proxy threshold, then the request for proxy is granted. 
3. Action Input Modifiers 
When a player or team decide on an action, and it is submitted in the Action 
Results Phase, the results of the action in terms of varying degrees of success and failure 
are determined by the sum of three dice after the addition and subtraction of influence 
modifiers. When a player or team rolls either a three or an eighteen the action is taken as 
a complete failure or success respectively; influence modifiers are not applied to a roll of 
three or eighteen. However, all other values of the sum of the dice are modified by a 
series of factors which will be explained in this section.   
4. Action Modifier Equation   
Let the following relationships apply: 
 d = regional leader of the region j for which the action is requested. 
 Covert Modifier  (CM) = (CovertModx * Covert)    
 CovertModx is the modifier for covertness for action x. 
 Covert  is 1 if action is covert, and 0 otherwise. 
 Scale Modifier (SM) = (ScaleModx* Scale) 
 ScaleModx is the modifier corresponding to the scale of 
action x. 
 Scale is the scale chosen for the action. 
 Actor Modifier (AM) = (τ7Σq=1–s *ActorModx,q *ActorChara,q ) 
 ActorModx,q is the modifier associated with any action x 
relative to resource or characteristics q of player a. 
 ActorChara,q is the characteristic q associated with any 
actor a (in this case a can fill the roll of the target, object, 
regional leader or actor) 
 τ7 is the weight for actor modifiers. 
 Actor Facility Modifier (AFM) = (τ8Σf=1–h* ActorFacModx,f * ActorFaca,f,j) 
 ActorFacModx,f is the modifier associated with the 
facility(f) for action x of the player. 
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 ActorFaca,f,j is 1 if the actor has a facility of type f in region 
j, 0 otherwise. 
 τ8 is the weight for actor facility modifiers. 
 Target Modifier (TM) = (τ9Σq=1–s* TargetModx,q  * ActorCharb,q ) 
 TargetModx,q is the modifier associated with any action x, 
relative to resource or characteristic q. 
 ActorCharb,q is the characteristic q associated with any 
actor b (in this case b fills the roll of the target) 
 τ9 is the weight for target modifiers 
 Target Fac Modifier(TFM)= + (τ10Σf=1-h*TargetFacModx,f*ActorFacb,f,j) 
 TargetFacModx,f is the modifier associated with facility f 
for action x. 
 ActorFacb,f,j is 1 if the actor has a facility of type f in region 
j, 0 otherwise. 
 τ 10 is the weight for target modifiers. 
 Object Modifier (OM) = (τ11Σq=1-s * ObjectModx,q * ActorCharc,q) 
 ObjectModx,q is the modifier associated with any action x 
relative to resource or characteristic q 
 ActorCharc,q is the characteristic q associated with any 
actor c (in this case an object) 
 τ11 is the weight for object modifiers. 
 Object Fac Modifier (OFM) = (τ12Σf=1-h*ObjectFacModx,f* ActorFacc,f,j ) 
 ObjectFacModx,f  is the modifier associated with facility f 
for action x. 
 τ12  is the weight object facility modifiers. 
 Region Modifier (RM) = +(τ13Σm=1-p * RegionModx,m * RegionAttributem,j ) 
 RegionModx,j is the modifier associated with attribute j for 
action x. 
 RegionAttributej,m is the attribute j associated with Region 
m. 
 τ13  is the weight for regional modifiers. 
 Econ Modifier (EM) = +(τ14[EconModx,a,b* Econa,b + EconModx,b,a* 
Econb,a + EconModx,d,a* Econd,a+ EconModx,c,b* Econb,c] 
 Econa,b is the level of trade from actor a to target b. 
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 EconModx,a,b is the modifier associated with the trade level 
from actor a to actor b for action x. 
 τ14 is the weight for econ modifiers. 
Action Modifier  =  CM + SM + AM +  AFM + TM + TFM + OM +OFM + RM + EM 
5. Affinity Resolution 
All players in the game have an affinity score with respect to every other player. 
The affinity represents the relationship between two actors and ultimately results in the 
amount of cooperation between two actors. A positive value will more than likely result 
in acceptance of a permission or proxy request or an action, and more cooperation 
between the two players. Negative affinity is an indication there may be hostility and or 
apathy between the two players, resulting in less cooperation between the two. NPA’s 
will require more incentive to cooperate if the affinity with the requesting player is 
negative. 
Affinity scores are tracked in the same method as players’ characteristics and 
resources, players are given a score on a scale of െ3	to	3 whereas scores internal to the 
game are tracked based on a value of െ100	to	100, with zero as the neutral value. Table 
2 describes the affinity between two actors: 






 –3  <  –100 Near warfare or absolute hostility 
–2 –41 to  –99 Hatred. Strong resistance to requests 
–1 –10 to  –40 Mild dislike. Beneficial actions permitted 
0 –9 to 10 Neutral 
1 10 to 40 Positive. Increased cooperation 
2 41 to 99 Friendship, most activities permitted 
3 >100 Alliance. Harmony and partnership 
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Players with an affinity score of three with an NPA may employ the resources 
belonging to that respective NPA. All of this NPA’s affinity values are revealed to the 
player. 
There are two ways during game play in which affinity scores are changed, one as 
a direct result of a specific action taken by a player. Or the second “through an algorithm 
that assesses a player’s relationships with all NPAs in the game, and determines the 
impact for the state of each relationship on all the others.”  So a player with a high 
affinity score with an NPA will more than likely result in increased cooperation between 
the two players. 
Affinity Equation 
affa,b,t+1  affa,b,t  adja,b,t  acteffa,b,t,x, j, a,c
{x  in actions}
{ j  in regions}
{c  in players}
  acteffa,b,t,x, j, b, c
{x  in actions}
{ j  in regions}




 a, b, c  refer to actor, target, and hearer  (a third-party, e.g., the region’s kingpin) 
 t names the turn 
 x  indexes the set of actions 
 j indexes the set of regions  
 c indexes  
 affa,b,t is the affinity between actors a and b from the previous turn t 
 adja,b,t is the adjustment resulting from “the enemy of my enemy” (see below) 
 The third term is a triple sum across actions, regions, and across all players acted 
on by player a. Each interaction between a and another player has a potential 
effect (“acteff” for “action effect”) on the affinity between a and b.  
 The fourth term is a triple sum across actions, regions, and across all players 
acting on b. Each interaction between b and another player has a potential effect 
on the affinity between a and b.  
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 Adjustments are considered when there are strong feelings of affinity between any 
two of the parties (requestor, hearer, target) involved in an action. The variable 
adja,b,t is the sum of two terms.   
 
If the affrequestor,hearer  is extreme and the affhearer, target  is extreme and in the same direction:
term1 = 
affhearer, target  affhearer, requestor
10hearers

If the affrequestor,hearer  is extreme and the affhearer, target  is extreme and is in the opposite direction:
term2 = 
affhearer, target  affhearer, requestor
10hearers
(Extreme values indicate | aff  |  >  40, which scales to > 2 or <  2 on Table 2)
 
   
Here the “requestor” can be either player a or a proxy; the “hearer” is the region’s 
kingpin; and the “target” is player b. 
6. Region PMESII Attributes  
This equation is the algorithm which determines the PMESII values for the 
regions. Using the original PMESII value for each region, it adds a triple summation of 
all the results of the actions, across all regions, by each player in a turn (equation in first 
set of parenthesis) multiplied by a weighting factor. The second term in parenthesis is the 
internal portion of the equation that sums all of the PMESII effects on each other across 
all PMESII values, across all regions, multiplied by a weighting factor. The fourth term is 
the association portion of the equation, which sums the impact of regions on regions 
across all regions, and multiplies them by a weighting factor. The last terms are the 
random variate, which is incorporated into the equation. 
m, i, j1  m, i, j   a *  x, a, i, b, c, t * actionEffects x, a, i , b, c, t
{x  in  actions}
{i  in  regions}








  in  mn * m, i , j  m, i, j 




 ra  ij * n, i, j  m, i , j 
{ j  in  regions}






a,b,c P where a,  b,  or c denotes actors
i, j,c R where i or j  denote specific geographic regions
m,n S,where m or n denote which PMESII values will be used
x, y A where x or y denote the specific actions taken by players, a,  b,  c
m,i,t  where m,i,t  denotes PMESII state m in region i at turn t  (this is 
            an absolute value that ranges from -100   m ,i,t    100
 x ,a,i,b,c,t  denotes when an action is taken by a player, this is a binary value
             set to 1 when an action is taken and multiplied by the result of the action
 a   action weight, applies significance weight of action a
 in   internal weight, applies a significance to PMESII interactions
 mn   internal impact weight applied to the affect m  on n
tij   regional impact weight applied to the affect of region i and region j
 ra   regional impact weight, applies a significance weight to regional association
 rv   random variable weight, applies a significance value to the random variable
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III. SCENARIO DESIGN AND GAME SET UP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 In order to create a simulation based model it was necessary to generate random 
numbers to select various roles in the game. In Java, a uniform random number generator 
(RNG) was utilized for this so that a turn could play through completion without human 
interaction or input. We generate random numbers to select each of the items listed in 
Table 3. This table shows the number of random variates required by this simulation for 
one turn of game play by one player. In every case we select from a set of choices 
(column 3) with equal probability (column 4) for this exercise (except that some Uniform 
(0,1) values are required for the PMESII changes), but users may select form any of the 
set of choices with any set of probabilities. We briefly examine the effect of changing 
some of these distributions in the Follow-On Simulations section of Chapter IV. 
Table 3.   Table of Random Numbers Generated 
Random  
Number 




1 Type of Action (DIME) 4 25% 
2 Actual Action:   There are four types of actions; once the 
type of action is determined the actual action is selected. 
Under each type of action there is a variable number of 
actions. This RNG will select which action is to be played 
(e.g., the D type action has six different actions to select 
from so each action has an equal chance of selection with 
a probability of 16.67%) . 
 
If D, 6 
If I, 16 
If M, 24 
If E, 11 
 
each D 16.6667 
each I 6.25% 
each M 4.1667% 
each E 9.0909% 
3–5 Three fair six sided dice:  Used in conjunction with the 
modifiers to determine the results the action is selected. 
If Die 1, 6 
If Die 2, 6 
If Die 3, 6 
Each die side has 
a 16.6667% 
chance 
6–8 Three fair six sided dice:  Used in the calculation to 
determine whether the proxy or permission request will be 
accepted or declined. 
If Die 1, 6 
If Die 2, 6 




If Die 3, 6 
9 Region of Action 8 12.5% 
7 Target selection:  If it is determined that the action only 
applies to an NPA, there are five NPA’s to select from, 
each with and equal 20% chance of selection. If the action 
applies to only a region, then there are eight regions with 
an equal 12.5% chance of selection. 




If Both, 13 
Each NPA 20% 
Each Region 
12.5% 
If Both 7.69% 
8 Proxy selection:  Is based on the region selection, the 
proxy is randomly selected from one of three NPAs. The 
three choices are the GoN, and the two NPAs with the 
highest influence, if GoN is one of the two NPA’s with the 
highest influence then the NPA with the third highest 







9 Option modifier:  On some actions the player has an 
option to spend resources on additional modifier points. 
All but three actions that have this option available have 
only one option on how many modifier points they can 
purchase.   This RNG, determines whether the player will 
chose to take this option if it is available to this action.   
 
2 




10 Extra Modifier:  Three of the actions have a choice on how 
many points that can be purchased. This RNG will select 
the choice for these three actions 
Action 3.22, 
5   
Action 4.9, 3   
Action 4.11, 
3   
 If 322, 20% 
If 49, 33.33% 
If 411, 33.33% 
10 Permission, Proxy, Unilateral action:  This RNG is used to 
select whether this action will be made after requesting 




Each  33.33% 
11–59 PMESII equation:  The random number utilized in 
equation 5 which is used to calculate the PMESII changes 
in each region.   
one number 




Uniform (0, 1) 
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B. STATUS REVIEW PHASE 
1. Initial Player Information 
a. Blue and Red Player Resources:  
These values are determined by the subject matter experts and are based 
on the amount of power a player should have. Note:  Players can not see each other’s 
values. 
(1) Blue Resources  
Influence Hubris D I M E Gen 
20 15 12 15 55 20 30 
 
(2) Blue Affinities  
GoN MEND Thugs IMN Church NW NE NC FCA Lagos SW SS SE 
–1  –3 3 1 –3 2 2 1 –1 –2 –2 –2 –2 
 
(3) Red Resources 
Influence Hubris D I M E Gen 
12 16 2 10 5 0 4 
 
(4) Red Affinities 
GoN MEND Thugs IMN Church NW NE NC FCA Lagos SW SS SE 
–1 –3 3 1 –3 2 2 1 –1 –2 –2 –2 –2 
b. Game Map 
The game map is divided into eight regions. Players select a region where 
the action is going to take place. For this study a new independent uniform random 
number is generated to select the region of play. All of the NPAs exist in each region; 
however, each NPA has a different affinity value in each region.   Players can ask 
permission to conduct an action of either the GoN, or of the NPA with the highest affinity 
in the region. The organization with the higher affinity would be the best choice to ask, 
but either can be asked. A Proxy is requested from the two highest affinity NPAs or the 
GoN within each region.  
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Figure 1.   Map of Nigeria broken into regions  
 Region 1 – North West (NW) Zone 
(1) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region are the 
IMN with 55 affinity points and Thugs with 42; the GoN affinity is 11. 
 Region 2 North East (NE) Zone 
(2) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region are the 
IMN with 110 affinity points and Thugs with 38; the GoN affinity is –4.   
 Region3 North Central (NC) Zone 
(3) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region are the 
IMN with 65 affinity points and Thugs with 42; the GoN affinity is 55.     
 Region 4 Federal Capital Territory (FCA) 
(4) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region are the 
IMN with a 20 affinity and GoN with affinity 68.     
 Region 5 Lagos  
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(5) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region is the 
church with an 80 affinity and GoN with affinity 90.     
 Region 6 South West (SW) Zone 
(6) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region is the 
church with a 50 affinity and GoN with affinity 45.     
 Region 7 South South (SS) Zone  
(7) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region is the 
church  with a 44 affinity and GoN with affinity 31.     
 Region 8 South East (SE) Zone 
(8) The NPAs with the highest affinity in this region is the 
MEND  with a 95 affinity, the church with a 91 affinity; the GoN affinity is 19.     
c. Region PMESII Values 
Values Determined by SME 
Table 4.   Region PMESII values 
 Pol Mil Econ Soc Info Info 
Region 1 –35 –55 –5 15 –2 –65 
Region 2 –70 –100 –75 –15 –60 –50 
Region 3 0 –68 –1 1.7 –15 –20 
Region 4 –5 65 20 65 32 45 
Region 5 15 45 90 75 50 45 
Region 6 –5 16 35 56 58 35 
Region 7 –87 16 19 –105 65 15 










Table 5.   Player PMESII display values 
 Pol Mil Econ Soc Info Info 
Region 1 –1 –2 0 1 0 –2 
Region 2 –2 –3 –2 –1 –2 –2 
Region 3 0 –2 0 0 –1 -1 
Region 4 0 2 1 2 1 2 
Region 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Region 6 0 1 1 2 2 1 
Region 7 –2 0 1 –3 2 1 
Region 8 –2 –1 –1 –1 1 –1 
 
d. Non Player Actors (NPA) 
(1) Government of Nigeria (GoN):   An NPA throughout the 
country of Nigeria; however it is located predominately in the FCA region. GoN is 
considered the “kingpin” in the FCA and Lagos regions. 
(2) Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN):  A minority Shiite 
group advocating Syncretism. Located in the NW, where they are the established 
“kingpins.” 
(3)  Movement to Emancipate the Niger Delta (MEND):  A 
group of Igbo and some Ijaw tribesmen wanting a bigger share of oil profits. Located in 
the SS zone and the SE, they are considered the “kingpins” of the SE. 
(4) Church:  An amalgamation of the Christian religious sects 
represented there, even though they support substantially different political parties.   
Predominately located in the South, they are also considered the “kingpins” in SW and 
SS. 
(5) Thugs:  (self-explanatory). Located predominantly in the 
North, they are not considered kingpins of any region but can be used for proxies.   
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C. ACTION SELECTION AND NEGOTIATION (PLANNING PHASE) 
1. Select Actions 
Players are provided the actions table with a brief description of each action as 
well as the cost. Players decide as a team what action they are going to select based on 
the objective of the game, which is provided by the moderator, or already established by 
the players in an attempt to study and provide training for a pre-determined situation and 
the possible impacts, of their actions. The actions table is custom-made by the SME and 
the players, and is established prior to the game commencing. The actions are based on 
current situations in the country as well as on input from the players on what they would 
like to see in the game.   In this study, each action is either selected by the moderator if a 
particular test is to be run, or by two random numbers, one to select the type of action 
(DIME) and the other to select the actual action based on the DIME selected previously. 
It is important to note that all random numbers are generated from one single random 
number generator in Java, so that the experiment could be replicated, when a seed value 
is utilized. The two random numbers allows percentage distributions to be put on the type 
of action (e.g., 50% of actions will be Intel). Table 6 is the action table provided to 
players for action selection. The action selected is based and the goal of the game 
established prior to game commencement, and is determined by the moderator or the 
players who may want to explore the possible results of an action in a training and 
planning evolution. The cost of the action is the amount of resources the player must have 
in order to be allowed to select that action. If the player does not have enough resources 
to cover the cost of the action that action can not be selected. In this study the action is 
selected by a random number generator. If the player does not have enough resources to 
cover the cost, the play will end, and the next turn will commence, resetting the values of 
the player resources to original settings.   
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Table 6.   Actions List 
  COST 
DIPLOMATIC ACTION Description D I M E 
Diplomatic overture / visit (small) Visit by minor diplomat / major diplomat / team of envoys  (action 11) 1       
Covert Diplomatic visit (small) Secret Visit by minor diplomat / major diplomat / team of envoys (action 12) 2       
Diplomatic overture / visit (med) Visit by team of envoys (action 13) 3       
Covert Diplomatic visit (med) Secret Visit by team of envoys (action 14) 6       
Diplomatic overture / visit (large) Visit by minor diplomat / major diplomat / team of envoys (action 15) 10       
Long-term Diplomatic Presence Establish consulate/”Build Embassy” (uses 7 points for 3 consecutive turns)   (action 16) 7x3       
INTELLIGENCE / 
INFORMATION ACTION      
Conduct Intelligence Efforts      
Conduct HUMINT, investigation 
(small) 
Intelligence personnel attempt to gain understanding of group . 
This action is automatically covert   (action 21)   1     
Conduct HUMINT, investigation 
(med) 
Intelligence personnel attempt to gain understanding of group . 
This action is automatically covert  (action 22)   3     
Conduct covert investigation 
(med) (action 23)    6     
Conduct HUMINT, investigation 
(large) 
Permissive: Large requires 2 affinity. Medium requires 1 
affinity.   (action 24)   10     
Conduct covert investigation 
(large) 
Permissive: Large requires 2 affinity. Medium requires 1 
affinity.   (action 25)   20     
Penetrate NPA group Intel personnel penetrate the organization.  * - if caught. Otherwise, penalties do not apply.  (action 26)   3     
Conduct Information 
Operation Action (27 placeholder in game, not used)     
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Small ‘target positive’ campaign Usually done to improve player image in an area where it’s low  May be done to support an ally  (action 28)   5     
Large ‘target positive’ campaign Usually done to improve player image in an area where it’s low  May be done to support an ally  (action 29)   15     
Small ‘target negative’ campaign Releases of negative news stories, commercials, ads. Operation is assumed covert at this cost.          (action 210)   5     
Large ‘target negative’ campaign Releases of negative news stories, commercials, ads. Operation is assumed covert at this cost.         (action 211)   15     
Small ‘target effective’ campaign Reinforces perception that targeted group is powerful  (action 212)   5     
Large ‘target effective’ campaign Reinforces perception that targeted group is powerful (action 213)   15     
Small ‘target ineffective’ 
campaign Reinforces perception that targeted group is weak  (action 214)   5     
Large ‘target ineffective’ 
campaign Reinforces perception that targeted group is weak   (action 215)   15     
“Build CIA Station” Inserts a token on the board. Automatically covert (uses 7 points for 3 consecutive turns)  (action 216)   7x3   10 
MILITARY ACTION 
Small security operations:  Conduct a small security operation  (action 31)     3   
Covert small security Operation Conduct a small covert security operation     (action 32)     6   
Medium security Operation   Conduct a medium security operation   (action 33)     10   
Covert Medium security Operation  Conduct a medium covert security operation  (action 34)     20   
Large security Operation  Conduct a large security operation (action 35)     30   
Small Peacekeeping / 
Peacemaking  Establish small military presence to prevent violence  (action 36)     10   
Med Peacekeeping / Peacemaking Establish med military presence to prevent violence (action 37)     30   
Large Peacekeeping / 
Peacemaking  
Large military presence to preserve order, prevent violence  
(action 38)     80   
XS Combat Operations Very small: car bombing, foot-mobile bomber. Sniper. Sm raid. (action 39)     3   
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S Combat Operations Small: truck bombing, platoon sized attack. Direct engagement of a small target (building).  (action 310)     10   
M Combat Operations Medium: Raid, company sized attack.   Direct engagement of a larger facility.  (action 311)     20   
L Combat Operations Large attack (Bn-sized).   Direct engagement on large facility, compound.  (action 312)     40   
VL Combat Operations Very large operation/invasion (BDE sized).   (action 313)     80   
Covert Operation - XS Small squad sized covert attack (action 314)   3 10   
Covert Operation - S Larger covert raid  (action 315)   6 20   
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster Rel 
- S Small effort to provide emergency aid  (action 316) 3 1 10 5 
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster 
Rel-M 
Larger effort to provide emergency humanitarian relief.  (action 
317) 7 2 20 10 
Humanitarian Assist / Disaster 
Rel-L 
Very Large effort to provide emergency humanitarian relief.  
(action 318) 15 5 40 20 
Training / Exercise - S Small training exercise   (action 319)     10   
Training / Exercise - M Medium training exercise  (action 320)     20   
Training / Exercise - L Large training exercise  (action 321)     40   
Personnel taking - arrest / 
kidnapping 
Kidnap or have target arrested 
(uses 1 points first turn, 3 points second turn and 10 points third 
turn)   (action 322) 
    1x3x10   
“Build  Base” Inserts a token on the board  (uses 7 points for 3 consecutive turns)  (action 323) 5   7x3 10 
“Build Covert Training Camp” Inserts a token on the board  (action 324)     5 5 
ECONOMIC ACTION 
Business Program / Initiative - 
Small 
Expand business contacts. Make small investments, Support 
existing infrastructures  (action 41) 1     10 
Business Program / Initiative - 
Med Conduct business with existing companies  (action 42) 2 1   20 
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Business Program / Initiative - 
Large Build Personal Business Infrastructures  (action 43) 3 2   40 
“Build Factory” Inserts a token on the board.  (action 44) 5 3   7x3 
Provide Stimulus Aid - Large Give money to organizations.  (action 45)       20 
Provide Stimulus Aid- Small Give money to organizations.  (action 46)       7 
NGO Support Fund NGO humanitarian activity in a region  (action 47)       10 
Impose Sanctions Restrict the power of an economy  (costs 4 every turn)  (action 48)       4 
Lift Sanctions Increase economic involvement, Must have sanctions in place  (action 49) 0 0 0 0 
Raise Tariffs Increase tax on imports and exports (action 410) 0 0 0 0 
Lower Tariffs Decrease tax on imports and exports, Must have tariffs in place  (action 411)       4 
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2. Selecting NPAs 
During this phase the players decide on the target for which they desire to perform 
the selected action. In this simulation the type of action and a random number determines 
the target. For each action it was determined if the action could take place on an NPA 
only, a region only, or if it could take place on both an NPA and a region. Once this is 
decided, a random number is generated, to select the target for the action based on the 
type of target available for that action. By classifying what type of target and action could 
be performed, the chance of an infeasible action was reduced (e.g., the action “kidnap 
NPA” occurs on an NPA, not a region; “build a CIA station” occurs in a region, not an 
NPA). The players also decide if they are going to ask for permission or proxy during this 
phase or act unilaterally.   In this simulation a random number was selected to determine 
if the player was going to ask permission, ask for a proxy or act unilaterally.   The action, 
target and desire to ask permission, proxy or unilaterally along with the hearer (who is 
being asked for permission or proxy) is passed to the game’s artificial Intelligence and 
the moderator to determine the results of the request for permission or proxy. 
D. ADJUSTMENT PHASE 
During this phase the players have no actions; the game’s artificial intelligence 
determines whether the proxy is accepted or permission granted if either has been 
requested. The approval of either a proxy or permission is determined by the proxy or 
permission equation cited in chapter two. If permission was granted or proxy accepted, 
then the player experiences an increase of 10% of the starting affinity with the region and 
the hearer NPA, as the two entities develop a better relationship. If permission was 
denied or proxy declined then there is a 10% decrease in the affinity between the player 
and the region and the player and the hearer NPA. In this simulation only the two NPAs 
with the highest affinity score, and the GoN (even if it is not the NPA with the highest 
affinity) can be asked permission or proxy.    
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E. ACTION (RESULTS REALLOCATION) PHASE 
During this phase, players decide whether to submit their action to the moderator 
or to cancel the action. This is based on the results of the permission or proxy request, 
which is determined in the adjustment phase. In this study, the goal is to study the effects 
of the various actions; therefore the players are not allowed to cancel an action. Instead 
the player will continued the action, but experience an increase of hubris, for continuing 
the action despite being told no.  
F. ADJUDICATION PHASE 
During this phase the game’s artificial intelligence utilizes the underlying 
algorithms to provide the results of the action. The underlying algorithm, which is cited 
in chapter two as the Action Modifier Equation is based on a roll of three, six sided fair 
dice (three random numbers drawn) and the addition or subtraction of all the roll 
modifiers. Roll modifiers are different for each action and are based on the PMESII 
values of the region selected, the hubris and influence of the player, the affinity of the 
player and the target, whether the action is covert or overt and whether there are any 
facilities owned by the player, and whether or not the player options to buy modifiers 
using resources.  
Success of the action is determined by the value of the dice roll and the addition 
or subtraction of the modifiers from the dice roll. Each action has a results key similar to 
that of Table 7. However, the actual values and results are determined by SME, who have 
studied the trends of the country utilizing the Afrobarometer data. This study takes the 
values and results provided by the SME at face value and does not analyze the 







Table 7.   General Action Results 
3 Complete failure 
<5 Medium Failure 
5–7 Small Failure 
8–12 No effect 
13–16 Small success 
17+ Medium success 
18 Complete success 
 
Once the results of the action have been determined, the following resources, 
affinities and characteristics are changed:  Player-region affinity, player-target affinity, 
player-hearer affinity, player-region affinity, target-hearer affinity, region-target affinity, 
hearer-region affinity, player hubris, DIME, influence, target hubris, hearer, influence, 
region PMESII, NPA benefit and self-benefit values. Once values have been calculated, a 
new turn starts or the game is over, depending on the initial criteria established prior to 




IV. ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A. PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES  
This game was originally developed to study the results of an action on society 
and to help players understand the possible repercussions for a particular action. The 
factors to consider are the PMESII values of the regions and how they are affected after a 
player’s turn, as well as the affinity values among players and regions. This model 
consists of roughly 2,000 input parameters, which were incorporated into the “games” 
underlying algorithms listed in chapter two. The developers provided the spreadsheets 
that were used to play the game for this study, and the model was recreated in Java using 
the exact equations provided in the spreadsheets, in order to reduce interpretation errors.  
(That is, when the documentation disagreed with the spreadsheets, the latter controlled.) 
The spreadsheets did have some missing data, which required research from several 
informal and formal papers written by the developers as well as correspondence with the 
developers to determine the correct data. Inevitably we had to take some latitude in filling 
in blanks. Additionally, there were some terminology conflicts, where a parameter would 
have several different names, requiring tracing back through the spreadsheets in order to 
link them up. Occasionally two parameters, with different names and values, were 
determined to be the same parameter. In this case one of the values was selected and used 
through all of the simulation runs. That being said, at each test point of the model the 
results of the model were the same as the results of the spreadsheets, until the data was 
fed into the algorithms. Since the developers could not provide the results of a single 
round of turns, at this point the values could no longer be compared for accuracy with the 
spreadsheets. Ideally the results of a turn should be compared to the actual data in the 
region or country of game play to verify the outcomes are accurately reflecting real world 
events.   All graphs and charts in this thesis were obtained using JMP10 software.  (JMP 
10, SAS Institute Inc, 2012) 
Set-up:  A control group was established and analyzed, in order to have a set of 
values to which to compare the results of follow-on simulations (see below). The control 
group consisted of 1,000 individual actions of the game (selected at random), which were 
 52
run via a computer simulation model written in Java. A seed value of 22 was selected for 
the random number generator (RNG) to ensure future replicability. The changes in 
regional PMESII values, player characteristics (hubris and influence) and resources 
(DIME), as well as player, NPA and region affinity values were recorded after each turn. 
At the beginning of each run the player’s DIME and all PMESII and affinity values for 
players and regions were reset to the original starting values.   
The following parameters, held constant in the control group, were varied in 
follow-on simulations to study the impact of players’ choices in actions as well as the 
effect the moderators could have by placing limitations on the players via parameters 
prior to commencement of the game. Of course, future work can modify any or all of 
these parameters in any reasonable way. 
Cost of Actions:  Players are given a set amount of resources (DIME) at the start 
of the game. These resources are refreshed at the start of each new play, with adjustments 
made based on the results of the prior action.   In the control group, when the RNG 
selected a number for an action which the player did not have sufficient resources to 
cover, the action was canceled. A total of 96 actions were cancelled in the control group. 
Figure 3 displays the counts of the cancelled actions (using the encoding scheme 
discussed below and Table 6). In most cases the cancellations were a result of the action 
cost exceeding the initial allotment of resources provided to the player. Several of the 
actions also have an additional affinity criterion that must be met; this affinity criterion 
may also have accounted for some of the cancellations. Follow-on simulations were run 
with player resources increased so all actions were within the range of the players’ 




Figure 2.   Bar chart representing actions (see Table 6) canceled due to insufficient 
resources to cover initial cost of action. 
Type of action:  For the control group, actions were set to run at a 25% 
probability of occurrence for each of the four types of actions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, 
Military, or Economic. These percentages were changed in follow-on simulations to 
evaluate the impact on PMESII and affinity values when there is a predominant type of 
action (e.g., making a Military action occur 50% of the time).   
Optional Modifiers:  Players have the option to purchase extra points for a dice 
roll modifier (higher values of a dice roll result in a more favorable chance of success of 
an action). The control group was set for the player to choose to purchase the modifier 
50% of the time. Follow-on simulations tested the impact of this parameter when that 
probability was changed to 100%, 75%, 25% and 0%.   
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Regions:  In the control group, actions were assigned to each of the eight regions 
with equal probability (12.5%). Follow-on simulations studied the impact of only one 
region being selected. 
Proxy:  For the control group it was mandated that the proxy be either the GoN or 
one of the NPAs with the highest affinities in each region. In regions one, two, three and 
eight there are two active NPAs plus the GoN; each of those entities had a 33.33% 
chance of selection. Since most NPAs have very low affinity values in regions four, five, 
six and seven, actions in those regions selected proxies from between one NPS and the 
GoN, each with a 50% chance of selection. Follow-on simulations changed the 
probability of selection to be 65% for the GoN or the NPA with the highest affinity, 
followed by 25% for the one second-highest affinity and 10% chance for the third, in the 
regions allotted the choice of three NPAs. The regions allotted two NPAs for proxies 
were given a 75% (for highest affinity) and 25% (for lowest) chance of selection.  
Permission, Proxy, Unilateral Actions:  The control group was set so that 
permission, proxy or unilateral actions each had a 33.33% chance of occurring. Follow-
on simulations were run where: 
 Permissions were not allowed 
 Proxies were not allowed 
 Only unilateral action allowed. 
 Only permission were allowed 
 Only proxy were allowed.  
 Only permission or proxies were allowed. 
B. ANALYSIS OF CONTROL GROUP 
1. RNG Parameters  
The two key parameters that change within each turn and are based on the random 
number generator are the region and action type. By default, both have a uniform 
distribution; each region and each action type have an equally likely chance of selection.  
The RNG selects the actual action to be played out in the game. The action 
numbers arise from our encoding scheme and are not uniformly distributed themselves. 
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The scheme is as follows: the first digit is the type of action, where D = 1, I = 2, M = 3, 
and E = 4. Following the first digit the next one to two digits is the actual action 
numbered from one to the end  (so, Military is of type 3, and since there are 24 military 
operations, Military actions are labeled 31, 32, 33, 34…..39, 310, 311….324). Table 6 
(Ch. 3) shows all four types of actions; each type has at least six actual actions that can be 
selected by the random number.   In Figure 3, a bar chart of the actual action that displays 
the action ranges with the following explanation:  The different groups represent the 
Diplomatic actions one through six (11–16), the Intel actions one through nine (21–29), 
the Military actions one through nine (31–39), and the Economic actions one through 
nine (41–49). Note that, in the control group, action types D, I, M and E are equally 
likely, and each action within a type is equally likely, so, since there are only six D 
actions, each is chosen with probability (1/4)(1/6), whereas each of the 24 M actions is 
chosen with probability (1/4)(1/24). The distribution of the actual actions can be seen in 
Figure 3, where the blue bars are Diplomatic actions, green are Intel actions, blue are 
Military and black are Economic actions. 
 
Figure 3.   Bar chart representing the frequency of each of the actual actions, colored by 
type of actions 
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The results of an action are based on the roll of three fair dice. However, the 
developers have included modifiers that are based on the values of several different 
parameters. The modifiers are applied to the result of the roll of the three dice; this 
modified result is what determines the results of the action selected by the player. Table 7 
in chapter three provides a general guideline for the result that corresponds to the value of 
the modified roll. Originally, the modified roll shows a distribution with two bars. This is 
a result of the modified dice roll being assigned an arbitrary value of 1,000 when the play 
is cancelled (due to lack of resources) and a value that is generally 18 or less when the 
play continues. The distribution of the modified dice roll is seen on the left side of Figure 
4; however, once the values of 1,000 were removed the modified dice roll distribution 
reflected the expected normal-like distribution pattern, seen in the histogram on the right 
side of Figure 4.  (Note that the modified value can actually exceed 18, because the 




Figure 4.   Side-by-side histograms of the distribution of the sum of three dice and the 
result of the dice roll after the modifiers are applied.  
When a modified result was assigned a value of 1,000, the play was terminated 
and all following data for the simulation resulted in zeros. Since the zeros were the result 
of cancelled actions and not a result of the actual game play, we chose to delete the 
cancelled actions (1,000) and their associated values from the data to be analyzed.   The 
control group therefore consisted of 904 simulation runs.   
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2. The Modifiers 
Region modifiers are based on the PMESII values of the region and range from a 
value of negative three to three. Modifiers act additively on the dice rolls. In most cases 
the modifier is applied when a PMESII value is extreme (>2 or < –2); analysis of the data 
reflects that the majority of actions have a zero value for the modifier. Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of region modifiers in the control group. Note that most are zero, and that the 
–1 value is somewhat more common than the +1 value.  
 
Figure 5.   Control group region modifier distribution 
Target modifiers are determined from a wide range of criteria:  for Diplomatic 
actions, the modifier is affected solely by the target’s affinity with the player, and can 
range from negative three to three with zero being the majority of modifier values. For 
Intel actions the modifiers range from negative ten to four; they are based on either the 
actual amount of Intel resources the target has acquired (for actions 21 through 28) or the 
target’s hubris or influence values (actions 29 through 218). This accounts for the small 
bar at negative 10 in Figure 6. For Military actions the target modifier is determined by 
the target-player affinity, but the value of the modifier is often a percentage of the 
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Military (in DIME) value of the target. Economic action modifiers range from negative 
two to two. As with the Diplomatic actions, the value of zero is the most common value 
for Intel, Military and Economic actions, as can be seen by bar chart in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   Control group target modifier distribution. 
Since the Hubris and Influence modifiers are determined by the player’s pre-
existing hubris and influence points, respectively, they apply only to Diplomatic actions 
and to Intel action number 29. The hubris modifier ranges from negative four to zero and 
the influence modifier ranges from zero to four. In the control group these two modifiers 
take on only the values one or zero, in the case of hubris, and two or zero, for influence. 
This is because if the action is something other than Diplomatic or action 29 these 
modifiers have value zero, and the values realized for these actions are few since the 
players’ hubris and influence points are reset to the original values at the start of each 
turn. These distributions will reflect a wider range of values when players’ starting points 
differ from turn to turn.   
The “other” modifier is determined by the number of facilities a player owns, as 
well as whether the action is covert or overt. Owning a facility provides a player with 
resource points (e.g., a factory gives a player three additional points for his or her 
Economy score). The facility also provides a modifier for each action that is taken that is 
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of the same type. So if a CIA station is established, a player will receive five Intel points 
every turn, and, on every turn that is type Intel, will receive five modifier points on the 
dice roll total. Additionally, if a play is covert, a modifier of one is added to the dice roll. 
These distributions would be expected to change with continuous play. For the control 
group, the player started with one CIA station and one embassy. Figure 7 (left panel) 
reflects the distribution of the “other” modifiers.  
The “option” modifier allows the player to buy modifier points using their DIME 
resources for some actions. In the control group, the probability that players were 
permitted to buy modifier points was set at 50%. Players with permission still needed to 
have sufficient resources to buy points. Some actions permit differing numbers of points 
to be bought; in those cases an additional random number selected the number of option 
points. Figure 7 (right panel) shows the distribution of “option” points purchased in the 
control group.  
 
  
Figure 7.   “Other” modifier distribution and “option” modifier distribution. 
3. Results 
There are numerous types of result from the GCM that can be examined. The 
outputs from a turn act as intermediate results, since they are then used in the underlying 
algorithm to predict the PMESII and affinity changes. However, they are of interest in 
themselves, since they help determine whether the model is acting as intended. Two 
intermediate results are the average size of the action, ranging from one to five, with one 
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being extra small and five being extra large, and the impact of the action, with negative 
one representing a negative impact, zero being neutral, and one being a positive impact. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the distributions of actions sizes and impacts in the control group. 
Actions of “extra small” size are seen to be rare, and most of the actions had a positive 
impact.   
 
Figure 8.   Distribution of action size, ranging from one (extra small) to five (extra large) 
 
Figure 9.   Impact values, where negative one is a negative impact, zero is neutral and 
one is a positive impact 
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Three other intermediate results of an action are (1) permission, (2) proxy request,  
and (3) no request for permission or proxy. Each of these has a 1/3 chance of being 
selected in the control group. Figure 10 displays the results of these requests. The column 
marked “1” shows permissions requested and granted, “2” shows permission requested 
and declined, “3” shows proxies requested and accepted, “4” shows proxies requested 
and declined, and “5” shows unilateral actions (in which no permission or proxy was 
requested). Once the option is selected by the RNG, the permission, and proxy equations 
given in chapter three are utilized to determine the results of the requests. 
 
Figure 10.   Distribution of permission (1 and 2), proxy (3 and 4), and unilateral (5) 
actions 
4. Analysis of the Target 
Since most actions have a positive impact (Figure 9), we expect to see an increase 
in target, player affinity and target, hearer affinity most of the time. Figure 11 is a scatter 
plot matrix of the impact of an action versus change in affinity between the target and 
requestor (left panel), and between the target and hearer (right panel). As expected, there 
is an increase in affinity (points above zero) for the positive and neutral results and a 
slight decrease in affinity in the negative impact actions. Some positive actions can 
produce negative changes in affinity.   
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Figure 11.   Impact vs. change in affinity of the target and requestor (left panel) and target 
and hearer (right panel). 
When the affinities between the target and NPAs, on the one hand, and the player, 
on the other, improve, it is expected that in general “good will” may be reflected 
positively in the affinity of the target and the region. This is supported in Figure 15, 
where we can see that as the target-player (left panel) and target-hearer affinity (right 
panel) increase, the target-region affinity also has a small trend upward.   
  
 
Figure 12.   Target-region affinity versus target-player (left panel) and target-hearer 
affinity (right panel) 
The relationships between target affinity and the results of a permission, proxy or 
unilateral request can be seen in Figure 13.   The general trend in Figure 13 appears to be 
that when a permission or proxy is requested and approved or accepted the affinity 
between the two players increases and when declined or denied, the affinity decreases. As 
before, permission requested and granted is represented by the value “1,” and denied by a 
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“2.”  The target-playerplot (left panel) shows an increase and decrease in affinity 
respectively as expected. Proxies requested and accepted are shown as “3” and those 
denied is “4”; the target-hearer plot (right panel) reflects similar results. A unilateral 
action is represented by line five, and there does not appear to be any definitive trend in 
any of the scatter plots. In this model, there is no direct linkage between the target-region 
affinity and the result of a permission or proxy request; this is reflected in the center 
panel of Figure 16. 
 
Figure 13.   Scatterplots of target affinities vs. permission, proxy and unilateral actions. 
5. Analysis of Player Characteristics and Resources 
Player characteristics (hubris and influence) change based on the results of an 
action, which is in turn determined by the final modified dice roll. Although the values 
for each result vary with each action, Table 5, in chapter three, provides a general average 
range for all actions and the corresponding results of the modified dice roll.   In theory, it 
would be expected that successful actions would tend to increase the influence and 
decrease the hubris of a player. Although for many actions there are no changes in these 
values, overall there should be a general trend in the appropriate direction. Figure 14 
shows an increase in influence with successful results (modified roll greater than 12) and 
an increase in hubris with unsuccessful results (modified roll less than 8), both of which 
support the expected theory. Also of note is that hubris is affected by the failure to gain 
permission or proxy upon request. Figure 15 shows changes in influence (for the starting 
value of 20) and of hubris (from 15) for permission and proxy requests (“2” and “4” 
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corresponding to permission denied and proxy declined, respectively). The figure shows 
that an increase in hubris and a decrease in influence for denials and declines, and an 
increase in influence and a decrease in hubris for approvals and acceptances. 
 
Figure 14.   Modified results versus player influence and hubris changes. 
 
Figure 15.   Player hubris versus permission, proxy, unilateral results (un-jittered). 
Player resources are used to pay for an action, so there should be a decrease in 
player resources for each type of action. Figure 16, which shows the old and new DIME 
values, indicates a decreasing trend in each of the new values. Some Economic actions 
show an increase in values after an action, because when an Economic action succeeds, it 




Figure 16.   Action type versus old and new player DIME values (un-jittered) 
Since the majority of the actions have a positive impact, it is expected that the 
control group should see an increase in affinity for the player in each region as well as 
with the target and the hearer. Figure 17 shows the changes in player affinity for the 
action type (far left plot), with each region (center left plot), with the targets (center right 
plot) and with the kingpin, otherwise known as hearer (far right plot).   The player versus 
action type plot shows that the majority of actions result in a ten- to twenty-point increase 
in affinity for the player, which can also be seen in the player’s affinity increase in each 
region, with each target and with each hearer.   The sparse data in the MEND column of 
in the player versus hearer plot) is due to the fact that MEND can be a hearer in only the 
SE region, and even then only has a 1/3 chance of being selected. In contrast, Thugs can 
be a hearer in three regions, IMN and Church in four regions, and GoN can be selected in 
all 8 regions.    
 
 
Figure 17.   Changes in player affinity 
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6. Region analysis 
Figure 18 shows the affinity changes experienced by the control group by region.   
In each of the “Affinity New” panels a forward trend to higher affinity can be observed. 
These are compared with the results of follow-on tests in order to compare the trends 
following the completion of an action.  
 
Figure 18.   Region starting affinity and ending affinity (jittered) 
Tables 8 through 10 show the summary statistics for the changes in PMESII 
values in the region where the action took place.  (The column headers correspond to the 
entries on pages 19 and 20.) The “info” column shows the change in information; in this 
version of the game there are no action results that affect the information resource. Table 
8’s entries show the mean changes; Table 9, the corresponding standard deviations; and 
Table 10, the maximum and minimum changes. 
Table 8.   Region PMESII mean change values 




NW 118  0.000 –0.059 1.644 1.576 0 0.229 
NE 136 –0.419 –0.007 0.721 1.029 0 0.117 
NC 102   0.068 0.686 2.627 2.451 0 0.716 
FCA 109 –0.027 0.514 2.193 1.037 0 0.376 
Lagos 125   0.424 0.200  2.312 2.168 0 0.536 
SW  120   0.491 0.092 1.725 0.550 0 0.158 
SS 103   0.476 0.893 1.019 1.068 0 0.340 
SE 91   0.033 0.637 1.934 0.637 0 0.033 
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Table 9.   Region PMESII  Std Deviation values 












NW 118 4.887 1.434 10.408 9.667 0 2.957 
NE 136 4.233 1.021 8.705 7.343 0 1.936 
NC 102 4.614 5.592 10.344 8.235 0 3.457 
FCA 109 3.510 5.329 7.665 8.367 0 2.497 
Lagos 125 3.699 1.576 9.585 6.968 0 2.330 
SW 120 5.372 1.749 9.508 8.717 0 2.487 
SS 103 4.650 5.750 8.241 6.694 0 2.487 
SE 91 4.557 5.853 9.857 6.641 0 3.063 
Table 10.   Region Min Max PMESII change values 












NW 118 –20 / 25 –5 / 10 –25 / 35 –30 / 22 0 / 0 –10 / 10 
NE 136 –20 / 25 –5 / 6 –30 / 35 –30 / 30 0 / 0 –10 / 10 
NC 102 –20 / 15 –5 / 55 –25 / 55 –30 / 30 0 / 0 –10 / 20 
FCA 109 –20 / 15 –4 / 55 –25 / 35 –23 / 60 0 / 0   –8 / 20 
Lagos 125 –20 / 15 –3 / 10 –20 / 35 –22 / 30 0 / 0   –4 / 10 
SW  120 –20 / 25 –5 / 10 –25 / 35 –30 / 30 0 / 0 –10 / 10 
SS 103 –20 / 25 –4 / 55 –21 / 30 –23 / 30 0 / 0   –8 / 20 
SE  91 –20 / 15 –5 / 55 –25 / 35 –30 / 30 0 / 0 –10 / 20 
 
C. DESIGN OF THE FOLLOW-ON SIMULATIONS 
1. Increasing Resources 
The purpose of this follow-on simulation was to evaluate the impact of increased 
resources. A simulation run of 1,000 actions, and an RNG seed value of 22 was run on 
which player resource points were increased to a value that met or exceeded all action 
costs available. We expect fewer cancellations, since most of these result from 
insufficient resources; of course, we do expect some cancellations because of the affinity 
criterion. Figure 19 displays the results of this simulation; and analysis confirmed the 
expected results of this test; the number of cancelled actions decreased from 96 to 16. 
(The right panel shows the actions after removing the ones cancelled for lack of 




Figure 19.   The left panel displays the results of the action with limited resources from the 
control group; the panel on the right is the result of a player with enough 
resources to cover any action. 
Figure 20 shows the actions that were cancelled. We see that the identified action 
cancellations are indeed a result of constraints set by the affinity criterion, rather than 
resource limitations. 
 
Figure 20.   Distribution of actual actions cancelled, from the simulation run with 
increased resources  
2. Increasing and Decreasing the Probability of Occurrence of Type of 
Actions 
To test the effects of changing the probability of a particular type of action, one 
simulation of 1,000 turns and an RNG seed value of 22 provided the results shown in 
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Table 11. Actions cancelled because of the affinity criterion were discarded. In each case 
one probability was changed, and the other possible random outcomes were given equal 
probabilities of occurrence. For example, in Test 1, a Diplomatic action was chosen with 
probability 0.5, and Intel, Military, and Economic actions chosen with probability 16.7% 
each. Probabilities were set in the different tests as shown in the “Prob D” and 
corresponding rows of Table 11. 
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Table 11.   Parameter changes as a result of changing the probability of one type of action 
Parameter Control Test 1 Test2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Test 7 Test 8 
Number of 
cancellations 96  53 75 126 89 32 72 152 80 
Prob D 25% 50% 17% 17% 17% 75% 8% 8% 8% 
Prob I 25% 17% 50% 17% 17% 8% 75% 8% 8% 
Prob M 25% 17% 17% 50% 17% 8% 8% 75% 8% 








0.759 0.799 0.768 0.665 0.830 0.811 0.755 0.573 0.898 
Permission 
Requested 
and granted  




119 105 150 109 96 91 196 113 94 
Proxy 
Requested 
and Accepted  
174 186 143 168 200 218 123 173 230 
Proxy 
Requested 
and Declined  
133 131 168 125 110 108 190 114 88 
Unilateral 








5.864 7.669 5.232 3.288 7.305 9.939 4.957 1.018 9.198 
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Target Hubris 
Change –0.027 –0.045 –0.068 0.007 0.006 –0.004 –0.075 –0.018 –0.016 
Player Hubris 
































–0.764 –0.336 –1.386 –0.728 –0.709 –0.275 –2.107 0.067 –0.083 
Player D 
Change –1.830 –2.867 –1.345 –1.614 –1.372 –3.975 –0.919 –1.450 –1.088 
Player I 
Change –1.898 –1.302 –3.4 –1.547 –1.317 –0.470 –4.811 –1.164 –0.889 
Player M 
Change 3.70 –2.495 –2.502 –7 –1.755 –0.791 –0.725 –10.511 –0.9 




Change 0.123 –0.045 –0.041 –0.158 0.853 0.090 0.061 –0.550 1.327 
Region M 
Change 0.336 0.141 0.145 0.223 0.629 0.116 0.121 0.322 0.866 
Region E 
Change 1.743 1.219 1.251 1.675 3.207 0.620 0.706 1.532 4.847 
Region S 
Change 1.321 0.941 0.971 0.748 3.396 0.660 0.714 0.120 5.087 
Region Info 








3. Changing the Probability of Proxy Selection 
In the next set of simulations the probability of NPA proxy selection was changed 
in order to observe parameter changes. In the control group each of the two or three 
NPAs had an equal chance of being selected. For this simulation the NPA with the 
highest affinity was given a 65% chance of selection, then next highest affinity was given 
a 25% chance of selection and the third a 10% chance. In the event only two NPAs were 
available for selection the probabilities were changed to 75% and 25%. Table 12 
summarizes the mean change in parameters and variables. 
4. Allowing Only One Region 
For this simulation, the player was not given a choice of regions. All turns 
occurred in the same region. For this simulation the region NW was arbitrarily chosen 
and Table 12 reflects the changes in parameters and variables that resulted.   
5. Changing the Option Modifier 
The GCM has several actions where the player is given the option to purchase 
modifier points to improve the value of the dice roll. The control group was set so the 
player had a 50% chance to select the modifier. Four follow-on simulations of 1,000 
actions and a seed value of 22 were run to examine the results of changing the player’s 
ability to select and purchase the option modifier. The probability of selecting the option 
modifier was set to 0%, 25%, 75% and 100%. It should be noted that as with the control 
group, even if the player chose to purchase the option modifier, if the resources were not 







Table 12.   Mean results of simulations 9–16 
Parameter Control Test 9 Test 10 Test 11 Test 12 Test 13 Test 14 
Number of 
Cancellations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 


















0.759 0.759 0.771 0.727 0.740 0.763 0.770 
Permission 
Requested 
and Granted  
182 183 179 183 183 183 183 
Permission 
Requested 
and Denied  
119 119 123 119 119 119 119 
Proxy 
Requested 
and Accepted  
174 173 159 173 173 173 173 
Proxy 
Requested 
and Declined  
133 133 147 133 133 133 133 
Unilateral 








5.864 5.820 6.101 5.493 5.581 6.084 6.173 
Target Hubris 
Change –0.027 –0.0267 –0.027 –0.045 –0.033 –0.021 –0.023 
Player Hubris 


































–0.764 –0.741 –0.824 –0.717 –0.739 –0.780 –0.756 
Player D 
Change –1.829 –1.829 –1.846 –1.837 –1.832 –1.834 –1.852 
Player I 
Change –1.898 –1.897 –1.896 –1.880 –1.891 –1.886 –1.869 
Player M 
Change –3.700 –3.711 –3.705 –3.768 –3.723 –3.691 –3.684 
Player E 
Change 1.700 –1.662 –1.659 –2.454 –2.060 –1.211 –0.884 
Region P 
Change 0.123 0.112 0.082 0.022 0.120 0.140 0.127 
Region M 
Change 0.336 0.336 0.327 0.342 0.340 0.340 0.338 
Region E 
Change 1.743 1.691 1.712 1.648 1.683 1.716 1.737 
Region S 
Change 1.321 1.308 1.176 1.274 1.259 1.288 1.272 
Region Info 




0.354 0.332 0.306 0.337 0.336 0.334 0.327 
 
6. Changing the Options to Request Permission and Proxies 
Five simulations of 1,000 actions and a seed value of 22 were run to test the 
impact of permissions and proxies. Every action either requires the player to seek 
permission (indicated by “Pe” in Table 13), request a proxy (“Pr”), or act unilaterally 
(“U”). The “Pe,Pr,U” row of Table 13 shows the results of these simulations. For 
example, the “0, .5, .5” in the “Pe, Pr, U” row of Test 15 shows that, in those simulations, 
players were not allowed to ask for permission, whereas proxies and unilateral actions 
each were given a 50% probability of occurrence. 
Test 16:  Player was not allowed to ask for a proxy. Permissions and unilateral 
actions were given a 50% probability of occurrence. 
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Table 13.   Mean results of simulations 15–19 
Parameter Control Test 15 Test 16 Test 17 Test 18 Test 19 
Number of 
Cancellations 96 96 96 96 96 96 








0.759 0.759 0.759 0.759 0.759 0.7589 
Permission 
Requested 
and Granted  
182 0 272 0 541 524 
Permission 
Requested 
and Denied  
119 0 187 0 363 0 
Proxy 
Requested 
and Accepted  




133 197 0 0 0 380 
Unilateral 








5.863 5.820 5.820 5.820 5.820 5.820 
Target Hubris 
Change –0.027 –0.027 –0.027 –0.027 –0.027 –0.027 
Player Hubris 


































–0.764 –0.686 –0.656 –0.623 –0.673 –0.726 
Player D 
Change –1.830 –1.829 –1.829 –1.829 –1.829 –1.829 
Player I 
Change –1.898 –1.897 –1.897 –1.897 –1.897 –1.897 
Player M 
Change 3.700 –3.711 –3.711 –3.711 –3.711 –3.711 
Player E 
Change 1.700 –1.661 –1.661 –1.661 –1.662 –1.662 
Region P 
Change 0.123 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 
Region M 
Change 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336 
Region E 
Change 1.743 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 
Region S 
Change 1.321 1.308 1.308 1.308 1.308 1.308 
Region Info 




0.354 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF FOLLOW-ON SIMULATIONS 
1. Comparing Control and Follow-on Tests 
In this section, we discuss the results of comparing the test conditions described 
above with the control condition. Changes in region PMESII values are discussed at the 
end of this chapter. 
Recall from earlier chapters that each set of simulations started with the RNG set 
to a common value. Each individual simulation receives the same number of random 
variates, so, for example, the 234th simulation of the control group and the 234th 
simulation in each of the test groups are provided the same random variates. In this sense, 
the control group and the test groups are “blocked” by replication number. However, the 
usual analysis for matched pairs or blocks is inappropriate here because of the way the 
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random variates are incorporated into the model. As an example, compare the selection of 
DIME action in the control case (in which each of the four types of actions is equally 
likely) to the case of Test 1 (in which Diplomatic actions take place with probability 
50%, and each of the other three takes place with probability 16.7%). In the control 
group, the action is selected by comparing the random variate to the set of cut-points 
(.25, .50, .75). If the variate is smaller than .25, a Diplomatic action is selected; if it is 
between .25 and .50, an Intel action is selected, and so on. In the Test 1 case, the same 
number is generated. It is then compared to the set of cut-points (.50, .67, .83). Therefore, 
every action of type D in the control group corresponds to an action of type D in the Test 
1 group, and every Test 1 action of type E maps back to a control group action of type E. 
The selection of the action is the only thing differentiating these two groups, and, since 
the action coincides on half of the plays, we know that the results will coincide with 
probability 0.5. 
In every one of our tests, the control and test groups have some substantial 
probability of producing the exact same results. In practice, of course, the results of 
simulations will have much more variability, since differing seeds for the RNG will be 
employed. In that case the usual t-test for differences in means between control and test 
conditions, or for analysis of variance, might be appropriate. The randomness in that 
model would then arise from the choice of individual variates across all seeds. By 
choosing common random numbers, we have much less variability in our results – but the 
assumptions of the paired t-test are not met. Our goal is not to perform statistically valid 
tests; instead it is to provide a framework to allow the game to be run many times, 
automatically and repeatably. Within this framework developers will be able to modify 
starting values, action availabilities and other parameters of the game with an eye toward 
increasing its validity, and to use the automatic nature of our framework to seek inputs 
intended to optimize some measure of success. 
Below we analyze the results from running the model under the test conditions. In 
some cases we have used paired t-tests simply for interpretability, taking p-values as 
rough effect size measures, rather than as strict probability statements that concern the 
plausibility of null hypotheses. 
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2. Test 1 through Test 8 Results  
Number of Cancellations:  The control group had 96 cancellations, which 
was 9.6% of the total actions. For each test, except Military actions, the number of 
cancellations decreased. For Diplomatic actions there are two large actions; the cost of 
both was within the amount of resources allotted to the player, so in theory increasing 
Diplomatic actions should decrease the number of cancellations. In Test one the number 
of Diplomatic actions was increased to 50%; this decreased cancellations to 5.3%. 
Increasing the number of Diplomatic actions to 75% decreased cancellations to 3.2%. For 
Intel actions there is only one action that the player does not have resources to cover on 
an initial turn. When Intel actions were increased to 50%, cancellations decreased to 
7.5% of the total and when increased to 75%, cancellations decreased to 7.2% of the total 
actions. There are several Intel actions which have affinity criteria that must be met;  this 
affects the number of cancellations. Military actions saw an increase in cancellations. 
There are three Military actions unavailable to the player due to the cost exceeding the 
player’s resources on the first turn. Increasing the Military actions to 50% saw an 
increase to 12.6% of total actions, and increasing Military action to 75% increased the 
total cancellations to 15.2% of the total actions. Economic actions have one action that is 
unavailable to the player. Increasing Economic actions to 50% decreased total 
cancellations to 8.9%, and increasing Economic actions to 75% saw a further decrease in 
cancellations to 8.0%     
Size of Actions:  From Table 11 we can see that in six of the eight tests the 
average size of actions decreased compared to the control group. Test 4 and Test 9 (both 
Economic action increases) showed increased sizes. The increases arose because the 
majority of Economic actions are either large or extra large in size, and they often impact 
the whole region (e.g., build a factory, impose sanctions, or impose tariffs). Out of the 
eleven possible Economic actions only three are size medium or smaller.   
Impact of Action:  The average impact of an action for the control group 
was 0.755, on a scale ranging from negative one for a negative impact to 0 for neutral and 
one for a positive impact. As discussed previously, the majority of plays resulted in a 
successful action, which in turn positively impacted the region and players.   From Table 
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11 we can see that the results of Tests 3, 6, and 7, were less than those in the control 
group, but still positive, and that the rest of the test groups showed a greater positive 
impact than the control group. In theory this should produce greater affinity between 
player and regions.   
There is a substantial correlation between mean action size and mean 
impact of action. Figure 21 shows the mean sizes and impacts for the control group and 
the eight test groups. (This is, then, an ecological correlation across a thousand or so 
replications; it might be valuable to further researchers to examine the individual values.) 
Also shown is the best-fitting line and a confidence interval for that line. This correlation, 
of size 0.77, indicates that, on average, the bigger the action, the greater the impact, at 
least in these test-wide means.   
 
Figure 21.   Test for correlation and multicolinearity between size so action and impact of 
action.  
Permission, proxy, and unilateral actions:  in the control group, 182 
actions involved permission being requested and granted; actions in which permission 
was requested and denied numbered 119; there were 174 proxies requested and accepted; 
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133 proxies requested and declined; and 296 unilateral actions.   In the test groups both of 
the tests in which the probability of an Intel action was increased saw a very high rate of 
rejections for permissions and proxies. This is possibly a direct reflection of the very low 
benefits allotted to all players for an Intel action. Player benefit values are utilized by the 
game’s artificial intelligence, and contribute to the permission and proxy equations. This 
should be investigated in follow-on studies.   
Player affinity, hubris and influence:  In the control group the player mean 
affinity value was 5.86, player hubris was 0.475 and player influence 0.485. In Tests 1, 4, 
5 and 8 player affinity was higher than in the control group and in Tests 2, 3, 6, 7, it was 
lower. However, in all tests the average player affinity remained positive and increased in 
value. The mean player affinity increased by as much as 9.9 points; the maximum 
increase in hubris was 1.06; and the maximum increate in influence was 1.45.   Hubris 
increased far less than affinity and is representative of the actions that failed. With the 
clearly positive impact of action averages, it can be concluded that many more actions 
succeeded than failed, which accounts for the large difference between affinity increases 
and hubris increases. These tests demonstrate that the positive and negative impact of 
actions successfully carries over to the affinity of a player and the player’s corresponding 
characteristics. As with hubris values, the influence values increased much less than the 
affinity value increases. Follow-on tests should investigate the small increase in 
influence; in theory this value should increase more along the lines of affinity values with 
the large number of actions resulting in a positive impact.   
Affinity relationships between the target, hearer (kingpin), requestor 
(player) and region:  In each of the following relationships there was a positive affinity 
change for each of the tests:  target-hearer, requestor-region, hearer-region, requestor-
target. This is attributed to the overall positive impact of the actions and thus 
relationships improved between the two entities. There was a decrease in affinity in the 
target and region relationship, which is a bit unexpected, but still within reason based on 
the small values of target-region affinity that was seen in the control group.   
Player resources (DIME):  These values were examined in order to ensure 
that the model was adequately deducting resources for an action while also adding in 
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resource points obtained as a reward for a successful action. Table 14 was obtained from 
the game’s settings, and displays the average costs of each of the four types of actions. Of 
interest is that numerous Military and Economic actions cost more than just Military and 
Economic resources. The large standard deviations are also worthy of note. 
Table 14.   Average action costs, obtained from game settings established by SME 
Type of Action Code Average Costs (deducted)   StdDev 




Diplomatic D = – 4.83 3.43    3.00 0 
Intel I = – 8.44 5.75 – 3.25 1.54 
Military 
D = – 2.05 4.15 
   2.50 17.1 
I = – 2.67 2.08 
M = – 22.2 21.2 
E = – 6.12 6.12 
Economic 
D = – 2.75 1.71 
 1.97 3.52 I = – 2.75 1.00 
E = – 6.12 13.6 
 
Comparing these values to the values that occurred in the test simulations:  The 
top-shaded block in each column of Table 15 represents a 50% increase in the type of 
action that corresponds to that resource. The bottom-shaded block represents the 75% 
increase in that type of action.   As expected the increased number of actions resulted in 
increased expenditures of that type of resources, which can be seen when comparing the 
shaded blocks to the control group. This lends some measure of validation to the intent of 
the game’s designers. Also of note is that each of the mean values is within one standard 




Table 15.   Table of player resources after conducting Tests 1–8, top shaded number in 
each column is 50% increase and the bottom number is 75%. 
Test D Changes I Changes M Changes E Changes 
Control – 1.830 – 1.898      3.700    1.700 
50% Diplomatic – 2.867 – 1.302   – 2.495 – 0.633 
50% Intel – 1.344 – 3.400   – 2.501 – 0.822 
50% Military – 1.614 – 1.547   – 7.000 – 1.763 
50% Economic – 1.372 – 1.317   – 1.755 – 3.222 
75% Diplomatic – 3.975 – 0.470   – 0.791    0.308 
75% Intel – 0.919 – 4.811   – 0.725 – 0.060 
75% Military – 1.450 – 1.164 – 10.511 – 2.154 
75% Economic – 1.088 – 0.889   – 0.900 – 4.759 
 
Test 9 results:  This test was run to examine the effect of a changing the 
parameters of the proxy, to something that could be considered more realistic for the 
region in which the action took place. In theory, the player with the highest affinity 
would have the highest chance of being selected as proxy, at 65%, since it would follow 
that there would be fewer declines and more acceptances due to the higher affinity.   A 
two-sample t-test, implemented as “Matched Pairs” in JMP (version 10), was run for each 
of the variables to test for a difference between the control group’s mean value and the 
mean of the Test 9 group. (Note our comment on the underlying randomness above.)  The 
results of these tests indicated that the averages of nearly all of the output variables are 
unchanged in Test 9, with the exception of the five interactive affinity terms. For the five 
interactive terms (target-hearer, requestor-region, hearer-region, requestor-target, and 
target-region) the mean affinity changes were all considered significantly different from 
the control group means. This was an expected result. However, unexpectedly, there was 
not a significant difference in the number of proxies accepted and declined.   
Test 10:  For this test the NW region was chosen arbitrarily. There was no 
difference in the mean values from the control group and the Test 10 group for the 
number of cancellations, action size or action impact. There was a slight decrease in 
permissions requested and accepted and proxies requested and granted, and a 
corresponding increase in permissions requested and declined and proxies requested and 
denied. This is more than likely due to the low affinity (–1 on a scale of –3 to 3) between 
the player and the NW region. With the higher number of denials and declines for 
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permission and proxy actions, it would be expected that the player’s affinity and 
influence would be lower and his hubris higher. This was not the case; hubris saw a tiny 
decline, while player influence and affinity both showed slight increases. It may be the 
case that the positive impact of the actions overshadowed the changes in affinity, 
influence and hubris that the denial and decline contribute to the respective values. Since 
the impact of actions continued to be generally positive for this test, it would be expected 
that there should be an affinity increase in the player-region and NPA affinities, and, 
indeed, the target-region, hearer-region, and player-region affinities all showed increases 
in the mean value of the new values over the starting values.   
Test 11–14 results:  These tests were conducted to evaluate the player’s option to 
purchase modifier points in order to improve his or her chance of having the action 
selected be successful. In these tests we expect an increased average impact of the action 
with increased probability of selecting the option, which in turn should also improve the 
interactive affinity terms of the regions and the players. In Test 11 (in which no modifier 
was allowed) and Test 12 (in which the option was allowed 25% of the time),  the 
expected decrease in the mean of the impact of action compared to the control group (in 
which the option was allowed 50% of the time) was observed. Conversely, in Tests 13 
and 14 (in which the option’s probability was 75% and 100% respectively) an increase in 
the mean impact of action value was seen; both were higher than the control group. Table 
16 shows the results of JMP’s “Matched Pairs” command when applied to the means of 
the control group and the test group. “No” indicates the difference was not statistically 
significant. Again, we present this as a guideline rather than as a probability statement 







Table 16.   JMP results for matched pairs test and for varying the option modifiers 
















No Modifier No No No No No No No 
25% 
Modifier 
No No No No No No No 
75% 
Modifier 
Yes Yes No No No No No 
100% 
Modifier 
No No No No No No No 
 
In the table, only two comparisons produced significantly different means. This is 
partially because often the simulations are unchanged between test and control group. 
Additionally, not all actions have a modifier option available, and if the player did not 
have sufficient resources, the option modifier, although approved, was not implemented 
in the dice roll.   The values for permission, proxies and unilateral actions did not change 
from the control group. An additional item that changed was the increase in expenditure 
of DIME resources since this is how the option modifier is exercised. This test indicates 
that the option modifier, as implemented here, is not making a significant impact on the 
results of the game. 
Tests 15–19:  These tests involved changing the probability for proxies and 
permissions to determine if there is a significant impact on affinity and PMESII values.   
In the control group, actions in which permission was requested had it denied around 
39% of the time. Among actions in which proxies were requested, 43% were declined. 
When only proxies and unilateral actions were allowed in Test group 15, the proportion 
of proxy requests declined average remained at 43%. In Test group 16, only permissions 
and unilateral actions were allowed. The average proportion of permissions that were 
denied increased slightly to 41%. In Test 18, only permissions were allowed and again 
the average of denials remained at 40%. In Test 19, where only proxies were allowed, the 
percentage of declined proxy requests was at 42% of all proxy requests. The big change 
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came in the affinity between players and regions. In Test groups 15, 16, 17 and 18 mean 
target-hearer affinities all decreased from the control group mean values, whereas in Test 
19, the target-hearer affinity increased. Mean requestor-region requestor-target affinities 
both showed increases with Test groups 16, 17 and 18 and decreases in Tests 15 and 19. 
Hearer-region affinity decreased in Test groups 16, 17 and 18 and increased in 15 and 19. 
Target-region affinities decreased in all test groups compared to the control group. These 
tests shows that the permission, proxy and unilateral actions do have an impact on the 
affinities. This test also shows that there is a built in proportional control in the 
underlying algorithms for permissions granted and denied and proxies accepted and 
declined.  
Results Region PMESII values:  Region PMESII values are a result of an 
extremely intricate infrastructure built into the game’s artificial intelligence and includes 
spillover effects from other regions. The examination of Region PMESII could support 
an entire additional study on its own. Each action that occurs in a particular region not 
only results in changes in that region’s PMESII values, but also in changes in the PMESII 
values of each of the other regions, through what is called association value. The SMEs 
determine these values in advance and based them on actual data from the regions. The 
association value represents the impacts of each region on each other (i.e., region one’s 
impact on region two, region one’s on region three, region two’s on region one, etc.). 
These values, multiplied by an association weight value, are included in the region 
PMESII calculations. There is also an internal score that is determined by values (also 
obtained by SME) placed on the interactions between PMESII variables (i.e., Political 
effect on Political, Political effect on Military, etc.). These values, multiplied by an 
internal weight value and then combined with the association values, contribute to the 
calculation of the new region PMESII values following each turn. Essentially, every 
action, in any region, will establish 48 new PMESII values (one of each PMESII entry for 
each of eight regions). However, the changes in PMESII values of most interest are the 
ones in the action’s region and we focus on those.  
Table 17 is a snapshot of the table of new PMESII values for the NW region after 
an action. The Action was 312, which is a Military action (3), and the actual action is a 
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large combat operation (12). The modified dice result was an eleven, which for this 
action is considered a success. The results of a successful combat operation on a region’s 
PMESII are –12 in P, –8 in M, –16 in E, –30 in S, 0 in Info, and –12 in Infra. These are 
the repercussions of the actions, but they do not represent the sole effect on the PMESII. 
For each of the 1,000 simulation, these values are inserted into the region PMESII 
equation (see equation 5 of chapter 2) and Table 17 shows the resulting changes.  
Table 17.   Snapshot of new PMESII values after an action  
Action Result Region NW P  NW M NW E NW S NW In NW Ir 
411 10 NE –34.42 –52.61 –4.60 11.54 –7.40 –64.06 
323 8 NW –34.42 –52.61 –4.60 11.54 –7.40 –64.06 
312 11 NW –70.42 –19.60 –88.61 –78.45 –7.40 –94.06 
48 12 SS –34.42 –52.61 –4.60 11.54 –7.40 –64.06 




The effects on PMESII remain the most impenetrable part of the model. Whether 
the PMESII values accurately reflect the changes in the region would require substantial 
additional investigation, perhaps by comparing the results of a real-world incident to a 
similar action in the simulation and observing how teach impacted the region. We have, 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we have greatly broadened the usability of the Green Country Model 
(GCM) so that it can be played without time-consuming and expensive human 
interaction. With our Java front-end the game can be run in thousandths of a second, 
rather than in the half-day currently required. This opens the door for future researchers 
to examine the relationships of input and outputs in the model, to evaluate the effects of 
changes in policy, starting values or other assumptions, to determine the distributions of 
outcomes under the randomness associated with the model, and if desired to seek the set 
of parameters that optimizes some result. 
Overall the Green Country Model appears to work accurately, in that it reflects 
what the developers intended. Therefore, it can be an effective training tool. This war-
game may accurately provide real-world insights about a society to game players (as long 
as the SME input is valid), and greatly assist in understanding the repercussions of an 
action, on numerous entities within a region.   By rebuilding this board game into a 
computer model that can quickly simulate actions thousands of times, we can help the 
developers understand the impact of the enormous number of parameters built into the 
game, as well as the effects on the end results of adjusting these parameters. This model 
could also prove useful to the SMEs, who provide an immense amount of input data for 
the game, prior to the game commencing. SMEs could use simulations to test the validity 
and limitations of their input data by testing the upper and lower bounds and comparing 
the outputs to real-world events. This model is not meant to be used to predict the results 
of an action on a society; however, it can provide users and even policy makers 
information about the effects of an action, as well as the ability to change the 
probabilities of occurrence in every parameter in order to assist in finding the best course 
of action for a situation. While this type of model can never replace the decision-making 
process for leaders, it might be effectively used as a training tool, allowing users to flesh 
out ideas and narrow the available options towards a more successful end result.   
The vast size and number of parameters in this model make it impossible to 
validate in one study. However, we believe that our study provides a good initiation into 
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the validation process, and the framework developed could be utilized and built on, to run 
thousands of other simulation tests and continue the validation process. Throughout the 
research, possible adjustments and follow-on studies have been proposed; these should be 
investigated to understand how or whether they impact the game. As a specific example, 
our tests did not reflect a large enough impact of the option modifier for it to make any 
difference. Similarly, the proxy and permission mechanisms are complicated and 
sophisticated, but in our game play the actual effects on the affinities are small. This 
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